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ROMA SURRECTA: 
Portrait of a Counterinsurgent Power, 216 BC – AD 72 
 This study evaluates the military history and practice of the Roman Empire in the context 
of contemporary counterinsurgency theory.  It purports that the majority of Rome’s security 
challenges fulfill the criteria of insurgency, and that Rome’s responses demonstrate 
counterinsurgency proficiency.  These assertions are proven by means of an extensive 
investigation of the grand strategic, military, and cultural aspects of the Roman state.  Fourteen 
instances of likely insurgency are identified and examined, permitting the application of broad 
theoretical precepts to episodes spanning 300 years of Roman power.  In summary, Rome 
demonstrates remarkable counterinsurgent sophistication, suggesting far more savvy and 
doctrinal agility than is afforded the Roman Empire by most modern observers.    
“Vercingetorix throws down his arms at the feet of Julius Caesar” 
Lionel Royer, 1899 
  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
i. Masada, AD 72         1 
ii. Definitions and criteria        5 
a. Insurgency        5  
b. Counterinsurgency       8 
iii. Modern theory, ancient practice      11  
iv. Caveats and significance       13 
v. Research design        18 
II. CONTEXT 
i. Historical Overview        20 
ii. Grand Strategy         25 
a. Economy        26 
b. Security        29 
c. Values        32 
iii. Army          35 
a. The army at war       37 
b. The army in the provinces      41 
c. The army transformed      44 
iv. Romanization         45 
a. Rome and the world       46  
b. The world and Rome       50 
III. CASE STUDIES 
i. Case selection         52 
ii. Insurgency in infancy        55 
a. Second Punic War       56  
b. Fourth Macedonian War      58 
  
c. Lusitanian and Numantine Wars     61 
iii. Insurgency at home        63 
a. Social War        64 
b. Spartacus and the Third Servile War    66 
iv. Insurgency abroad        69 
a. Revolt of Vercingetorix      70 
b. Dalmatian and Pannonian Revolts     73 
c. Revolts of Florus and Sacrovir     75 
d. Revolt of Tacfarinas       76 
e. Revolt of Boudicca       80 
f. Batavian Revolt       82 
v. Insurgency triumphant        84 
a. Arminius’ Revolt and Battle of Teutoburg Forest   84 
b. Mauretanians, Ituraeans, and Isaurians    88 
vi. Insurgency realized        90 
a. Jewish War        90 
IV. ANALYSIS 
i. Insurgents against Rome       96 
a. Modern criteria       96 
b. Ancient context       100 
ii. Rome the counterinsurgent       102 
a. Modern criteria       103 
b. Ancient context       106 
V. CONCLUSION 
i. Findings          109 
ii. Modern practice, ancient precedent      112 
VI. BIBLIOGRAPHY         114 
1 
 
“With two thousand years of examples behind us we have no excuse, when 
fighting, for not fighting well.” 
- T.E. Lawrence, letter to B.H. Liddell Hart 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
i. Masada, AD 72 
In a lonely patch of desert, a band of insurgents made their last stand against the strongest 
military power in the world.  They were men of fierce religious and ideological conviction, 
committed to the destruction of a government they viewed as sacrilegious and corrupt.  To this 
end, they had embraced the tactics of terrorism, harnessing acts of assassination, kidnapping, and 
targeted violence in an attempt to realize their political goals.  They stood opposed by a force 
roughly fifteen times their size, equipped with vastly superior war-fighting knowledge and 
battlefield technology.  It was an army with a clear objective: the stabilization of local rule and 
the neutralization of lingering sources of unrest.  These isolated insurgents represented the final, 
hard-line supporters of a movement that had taken years to suppress.  Cordoning off all possible 
avenues of escape, the force advanced methodically, making use of the overwhelming manpower 
and material at its disposal.  When the final confrontation came, the insurgents chose martyrdom; 
their opponents, meanwhile, sent an unmistakable signal that further revolt would not be 
tolerated.  It was a textbook conclusion to an episode that might sound familiar to any student of 
counterinsurgency, from French Algeria and British Malaya to American Vietnam to the 
contemporary challenges of Iraq and Afghanistan.  This particular encounter, however, did not 
take place in this decade, century, or even millennium.  Instead, it occurred at the Judaean 
fortress of Masada, some 2,000 years ago. 
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In AD 72, the Roman Empire – uncontested superpower of the Western world – had 
entered the final stage of her operations against Jewish rebels in the province of Judaea.  Having 
reasserted control over local population centers and retaken the crucial city of Jerusalem, the 
Romans advanced on Masada, last pinprick of resistance in the failed Jewish revolt.1  Masada 
represented a foreboding target, cresting a plateau that rose as much as 1,250 feet above the 
desert floor and enclosed by massive fortifications that ran the summit’s perimeter.2  The fortress 
was manned by 962 of the Jewish Sicarii, zealots whose rallying cry of “No Lord but God” had 
sparked widespread resistance against the provincial government of the hated Roman suzerain.3  
For the Sicarii, the starkness of their rhetoric was matched by the violence of their actions: they 
had slain a Jewish high priest in broad daylight, and overseen any number of political murders in 
order to sustain momentum against their Roman occupiers.4  Of the revolt which had swept 
Judaea six years earlier, they were all that remained. 
 The intensity of the Roman response, however, stands as one of the most disproportionate 
outlays of military force in ancient history.  Against a ragtag array of 962 insurgents, the Romans 
deployed a crack army of 15,000.  Included in these assets were the power and resources of an 
entire legion, at a time when only twenty-nine legions existed to police and defend an empire of 
1.5 million square miles and seventy million souls.5  The method by which Rome reduced the 
fortress was similarly overwhelming.  In an effort that may have stretched into years, army 
                                               
1
 Susan Sorek, The Jews Against Rome (New York: Continuum Books, 2008), 137-141. 
2
 Ibid, 141. 
3
 Ibid, 143; Joseph., BJ 7.10.1. 
4
 Solomon Zeitlin, “The Sicarii and Masada,” Jewish Quarterly Review Vol. 57, Num. 4 (1967): 251-270, 
259. 
5Edward Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 
1976), 3; Susan Mattern, “Counterinsurgency and the Enemies of Rome,” in Makers of Ancient Strategy: 
From the Persian Wars to the Fall of Rome, ed. Victor Davis Hanson (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2010): 163-185, 163. 
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engineers assembled a giant ramp of earth and timber that rose hundreds of feet into the air.6  As 
the man-made structure loomed higher, the hope of the Jewish defenders dwindled further.  
Eventually, as Masada’s walls began to crumble before Roman siege engines, all but seven 
noncombatants took their lives in a ritual suicide.7  The Sicarii achieved immortality.  The 
Romans effectively subdued Judaea for the next sixty years.8 
 For traditional students of Roman military history, Masada raises important questions.  
Why did Rome direct so many resources toward so marginal target, necessitating the 
establishment of massive camps and the provisioning of millions of gallons of water?9  Why, 
instead of a more limited blockade or more direct assault, did Rome undertake such a 
complicated and time-consuming feat of engineering?  Indeed, why was Rome so intent on 
capturing Masada in the first place, a fortress of questionable strategic value and a negligible 
security threat?10  Edward Luttwak offers a convincing explanation: 
This was a vast and seemingly irrational commitment of scarce military manpower – or was it?  The entire 
three-year operation, and the very insignificance of its objective, must have made an ominous impression 
on those in the East who might otherwise have been tempted to contemplate revolt: the lesson of Masada 
was that the Romans would pursue rebellion even to mountain tops in remote deserts to destroy its last 
vestiges, regardless of cost.11 
The Roman experience against Masada cannot be understood in the context of a traditional 
military engagement.  Its investment was too much; its aims and immediate payoff too marginal.  
Instead, the stunning siege and capture of Masada was conceived as theater, intended not for a 
garrison 962 ill-equipped rebels, but for the citizens of Judaea itself.  It was an operation which 
                                               
6
 Sorek 2008, 143. 
7
 Joseph., BJ 7.9.2. 
8
 Martin Goodman, The Ruling Class of Judaea: The Origins of the Jewish Revolt against Rome, A.D. 66-
70 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 260. 
9
 Sorek 2008, 143. 
10
 Luttwak 1976, 3. 
11
 Ibid, 4. 
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stressed governmental legitimacy and population-centrism.  In short, it was the closing act of a 
deliberate, successful counterinsurgency campaign.     
 Neither can Masada be alone in this distinction.  Rome grew to shoulder imperial 
commitments from North Africa to Britain to the Balkans.  Polybius speaks proudly of “almost 
the whole inhabited world” being brought under Roman control within a generation.12  With this 
increasing empire came increasing incidents of unrest, rebellion, and revolt.  In our scant number 
of surviving texts, one scholar counts no less than 120 major insurrections between the ascension 
of the first emperor Augustus in 27 BC and the reign of the seventeenth emperor Commodus in 
AD 190.13  The real number is doubtlessly much higher.14  Yet despite this multitude of 
challenges, the Roman Empire survived – and thrived – in the West for over 600 years.15  Rome 
could not have achieved such success without an effective and well-formulated 
counterinsurgency strategy.  It is the purpose of this study to examine the context, reality, and 
theoretical grounding of this ancient practice in light of contemporary counterinsurgency 
doctrine. 
 
 
 
                                               
12
 Polyb. 1.1. 
13
 Thomas Perkary, “Sedito, Unruhen und Revolten im romischen Reich von Augustus bis Commodus,” 
Ancient Society 18 (1987): 133-150.  
14
 Mattern 2010, 163. 
15
 Arthur M. Eckstein, “Rome in the Middle Republic,” in Kimberly Kagan, The Imperial Moment 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010): 32-60, 56; Jonathan P. Roth, Roman Warfare, (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 264-265.  The lifespan of the Western Roman Empire is a 
subject of much debate.  Here are used the endpoints 146 BC (the fall of Carthage and neutralization of 
the Achaean League) and 476 AD (the deposition of the final Western Emperor by the German king 
Odoacer).  Approximated to 600 years for the purpose of this study.   
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ii. Definitions and Criteria 
Evaluation of Roman counterinsurgency through the lens of modern scholarship must 
begin with an appropriate definition of terms.  Insurgency and counterinsurgency are 
multivariate phenomena with a range of traits and common attributes.  By identifying these 
characteristics, it is possible to create a set of criteria by which Roman practice may be judged.  
Although counterinsurgency literature has ballooned in recent years, this study restricts itself to 
two central texts.  David Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice informs 
most of the concepts explored in this paper.  While Galula’s famous document is now nearly a 
half-century old, it remains a foundational and frequently-cited work in contemporary inquiries.  
Where a more recent perspective is required, Galula is supplemented by FM 3-24, the 
counterinsurgency field manual published jointly by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps and 
updated most recently in 2006.  The prescriptions of these texts are taken at face value; it is 
beyond the purview of this study to explore nuances in modern definition.  
a. Insurgency 
There is a tendency to conflate the notions of insurgency and irregular war.  While the 
two concepts are related, they are not synonymous.  A successful insurgency often harnesses 
asymmetrical tactics, but its scope goes further.  In the words of Galula, “Insurgency is the 
pursuit of the policy of a party, inside a country, by every means.”16  FM 3-24 refines this 
definition by qualifying insurgency as an organized, protracted politico-military struggle which 
weakens the legitimacy of a government or other political authority.17  An insurgency may utilize 
                                               
16
 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger Security 
International, 1964; 2006), 1. 
17
 FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Headquarters Department of the Army, 2006), Section 1-2. 
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violence, but only if it is directed toward a larger, Clausewitzian objective.  Insurgents are not 
brigands; it is the accruement of political capital, not economic gain, which directs the course of 
their movement.  Gradually, increased political authority strengthens the insurgent cause, 
affecting a proportional reduction in the power of the existing state.18  Because insurgent strength 
is measured entirely by its political legitimacy, population persuasion constitutes the central 
purpose of every insurgent action.19  In an ideal insurgency, the insurgent movement will grow 
from small to large.  Conversely, the counterinsurgent will decline from large to small in direct 
relation to this insurgent success.20 
An insurgency’s beginnings are necessarily tenuous and uncertain.  At the offset, its chief 
strengths are intangible.  In Galula’s assessment, “The insurgent has a formidable asset – the 
ideological power of a cause on which to base his action…The insurgent’s strategy will naturally 
aim at converting his intangible assets into concrete ones.”21   Accordingly, an insurgency’s 
cause is critically important; it must be capable of attracting the largest number of supporters 
while repelling the least number of opponents.  The cause (or series of causes) should also be 
acute, sustainable, and not easily co-opted by the existing state.22  After establishing its 
ideological roots, insurgency takes time to develop.  A central core of supporters is slowly 
augmented by other factions with their own varying interests.  While such coalition-building 
adds strength, it also increases the danger of potential disunity.23  Such fragmentation is often 
averted by the presence of a strong leader.24  All the while, shock and overt aggression are 
                                               
18
 Ibid, Section 1-3. 
19
 Galula 1964, 5. 
20
 Ibid, 4. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Ibid, 11-13. 
23
 Ibid, 30-31. 
24
 FM 3-24 2006, Section 1-59. 
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avoided until the insurgency is thought capable of withstanding the initial counterinsurgent 
response.25  This grants insurgents the important advantage of strategic initiative; the existing 
state will invariably begin any confrontation as the reactive power.26 
Once an insurgency begins its active struggle against the existing state, violence becomes 
an important aspect of its survival and further evolution. These first attacks are asymmetrical (the 
insurgent faces a severe material disadvantage), and are directed more toward persuasion than 
attrition.  The ambush of a counterinsurgent patrol, for instance, may be intended to win local 
support or implicate the wider population against the existing state.27  Other operations may 
explicitly target moderates and counterinsurgent sympathizers, intended to rally support through 
coercion and fear.28  Meanwhile, the insurgency protects itself from reprisal by making use of 
difficult terrain and scattered population centers.29  Any success, either real or fabricated, is 
harnessed to great propaganda effect.30  As the insurgency grows, its use of violence becomes 
more ambitious and bold.  Guerilla forces are transformed into standing armies, posing a 
challenge to the existing state’s conventional superiority.31  A formal counterstate emerges, 
within which the insurgency must adopt the governmental functions previously held by the 
counterinsurgent.32  This transformation is reflected by the three-step approach envisioned by 
Mao Zedong’s Theory of Protracted War, in which strategic defensive turns to strategic 
stalemate before the insurgent undertakes the strategic counteroffensive to eradicate the old 
                                               
25
 Galula 1964, 6. 
26
 FM 3-24 2006, Section 1-9. 
27
 Galula 1964, 33-35. 
28
 FM 3-24 2006, Section 1-28 to 29. 
29
 Galula 1964, 23-24. 
30
 Ibid, 9. 
31
 Ibid, 39. 
32
 FM 3-24 2006, Section 1-33. 
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government’s remaining military capability.33  While this process guarantees final insurgent 
victory, it also increases insurgent vulnerability.  A premature shift from unconventional to 
conventional tactics consolidates the insurgency’s resources in one place, leaving it open to 
destruction.34 
This definition presents a solid set of traits which any instance of insurgency – even cases 
two millennia past – should be expected to demonstrate.  A strong ideological cause is used to 
build a coalition of support, united tenuously and often by the aid of an influential leader.  When 
violence erupts, its methods are primarily asymmetrical and directed as much toward political 
utility as toward directly undermining the existing state.  Mounting popular support and material 
capability permits the use of conventional force, but also pose new dangers as previously 
disparate insurgent elements are united in a standing army.  All the while, the population remains 
a primary focus, and insurgent success is tied directly to political legitimacy.  As this study 
progresses, these criteria will be continually referenced and applied.           
b. Counterinsurgency 
 Just as insurgency demands the acquisition of political authority at the expense of the 
existing state, so counterinsurgency requires the neutralization of insurgent authority and 
restoration of governmental legitimacy.  FM 3-24 defines counterinsurgency as the, “Military, 
paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to 
defeat insurgency.”35  The possession and employment of superior force – critical in 
conventional military encounters – is often ineffective or counterproductive in counterinsurgency 
                                               
33
 Ibid, Section 1-31. 
34
 Galula 1964, 36. 
35
 FM 3-24 2006, Section 1-2. 
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operations.36  Because an insurgency cedes force superiority in favor of tactics of disruption and 
attrition, the state’s inherent conventional advantage is of limited use.37  There is no physical 
center of gravity, and the resources necessary to eradicate every insurgent cell are typically 
beyond that of the strongest state.38  Instead, successful counterinsurgent action depends on 
reducing insurgent support among the population.  This requires a conscious strategy by which 
government authority is reasserted, either by peaceful consent or violent coercion.39  As the 
counterinsurgent gains legitimacy, the insurgent loses it, being deprived of vital support in the 
process.      
 By the nature, initial insurgent acts catch the existing state off guard.  Counterinsurgency 
constitutes a “learning competition” whereby the status quo power struggles to keep up with the 
actions of its rogue element.40  Quick adaptation to the insurgent threat is prevented by a rigid set 
of social, political, and military controls.41  Once the state has reoriented toward the insurgency 
challenge: 
Counterinsurgents face a populace containing an active minority supporting the government and an equally 
small militant faction opposing it.  Success requires the government to be accepted as legitimate by most of 
that uncommitted middle, which also includes passive supporters of both sides.  Because of the ease of 
sowing disorder [for the insurgent]…a solid majority is often essential.42 
While support of the population is vital to counterinsurgent victory, this support is also 
conditional.  The state must demonstrate its power to neutral observers, contrived in such a way 
as to reduce sympathy for the insurgent in the process.43  If the counterinsurgent is unable to 
                                               
36
 Ibid, Section 1-1. 
37
 Galula 1964, 4. 
38
 Ibid, 50-51. 
39
 FM 3-24 2006, Section 1-113. 
40
 Ibid, Section 1-1. 
41
 Galula 1964, 7. 
42
 FM 3-24 2006, Section 1-108. 
43
 Galula 1964, 54-55. 
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muster this effort, it will be unable to achieve sustainable advantage.  Simply killing insurgents is 
insufficient unless doing so entails a permanent drop in insurgent support.44 
 Galula offers a series of concrete steps which, coupled with the systematic clearing and 
holding of population centers, are intended to reduce insurgent sympathy and capability.45  This 
begins with the expulsion of active insurgent cells and persuasion of the neutral population 
through demonstration of military superiority.  Next follows a broader diplomatic offensive 
directed toward moderates and passive insurgent supporters.  This action is intended to divide the 
insurgents from the people, reaffirming the legitimacy of existing government.  Remaining 
insurgents among the population are eliminated and power is returned to local elites.  The final 
traces of insurgency, now isolated and withdrawn to their respective strongholds, are neutralized.  
Such suppression takes advantage of wedge-driving mechanisms like offers of amnesty as well 
as the direct levying of force.  Since the insurgency can no longer draw additional recruits, 
military might becomes correspondingly more effective.  According to FM 3-24, all insurgent 
sanctuaries must be eliminated for a counterinsurgency operation to see success.46                    
 This definition of counterinsurgency suggests a sophistication which might nevertheless 
find corollaries in ancient practice.  Its most salient points are the restoration of governmental 
legitimacy, the isolation and eradication of insurgent forces, and an overriding emphasis on 
population-centrism.  Conventional military superiority is used for the purpose of persuasion, 
reducing insurgent support by targeting its underlying political authority.  Meanwhile, direct 
attacks on the insurgency are accomplished through a combination of military and diplomatic 
                                               
44
 FM 3-24 2006, Section 1-2. 
45
 Galula 1964, 52; 76-94.  Until noted otherwise, all information drawn from Galula’s “Operations” chapter 
on counterinsurgency implementation. 
46
 FM 3-24 2006, Section 1-85. 
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initiatives.  These general counterinsurgency principles will be consulted and contrasted with 
regard to ancient precedent throughout the length of this paper.     
 
iii. Modern theory, ancient practice 
 It may seem an odd fit to apply these modern theoretical concepts to ancient Roman 
military practice.  Popular conceptions of Rome see images of savage gladiatorial combat and 
mercilessly advancing legions.  Romans are the crucifiers of Jesus in Ben-Hur and Kirk Douglas 
in Spartacus.  A cursory familiarity with Roman history – dominated by incidents of 
warmongering and ruthless reprisals – hardly paints a more flattering picture.  Even Roman 
culture permeates with bloodlust and violence: two of the city’s most celebrated founding myths 
concern fratricide and a glorification of rape.47  Romans are not politically aware and socially 
conscious occupiers; they are brutes.  Yet, despite wide-ranging incongruities between Rome and 
modern counterinsurgent powers, the application remains well founded.  It functions by means of 
two central propositions: that nearly all of Rome’s military challenges can be understood as 
insurgencies and that Rome’s reaction evidences many of the tenets still foundational to 
counterinsurgency theory today.   
 Insurgents against Rome. Following Rome’s emergence as the sole superpower of the 
West after the concurrent obliteration of Carthage and defeat of the Achaean League in 146 BC, 
the nature of Rome’s security challenges changed decisively.  Besides a disastrous campaign 
                                               
47
 Livy 1.7; 1.9.  Death of Remus and Rape of the Sabine Women. 
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against the Parthians in 53 BC, Rome faced no significant external threat for several centuries.48  
Instead, Rome was beset by revolts: revolts in Italy, Iberia, Gaul, Germany, North Africa, 
Britain, Judaea, and nearly every other part of the empire at one time or another.  The individual 
causes of these revolts vary (and for many, the particulars have been lost to time), yet it is 
possible to pick out a number of traits common between them.  In his analysis of five major 
rebellions, for instance, Stephen Dryson identifies a backlash against local “Romanized” elites, a 
cause shrouded in nativist and religious rhetoric, and the gradual transition from irregular to 
regular warfare.49  Modern understanding of insurgency – characterized by a challenge to 
governmental legitimacy, an overriding political objective, and a movement from guerilla to 
conventional tactics – bears close resemblance to these ancient cases. 50  
      Rome as counterinsurgent.  Even as Rome grappled with insurgency, it showed 
remarkable proficiency in resisting its effects and neutralizing its causes.  Rome’s success on the 
first count should be self-evident.  Despite technological limitations in which communication 
could take weeks and sizable troop mobilization the better part of a year, the Western Roman 
Empire was able to retain its diverse and distant provinces for six centuries.  Moreover, Rome 
consistently stamped out insurgency (often for decades) with a limited intelligence network and 
an army notoriously ill-equipped for low-intensity encounters.51  Following the failed rebellion 
of the Gallic Vercingetorix against Caesar in 52 BC, for instance, Gaul transformed into a 
                                               
48
 Cassius Dio, 40.16-30; Graham Webster, The Roman Imperial Army of the First and Second Centuries 
A.D., 3rd ed. (University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 29.  Crassus’ failed subjugation of Parthia and 
gradual reduction of the Parthian menace.  While wars with Parthia continued, they did not again 
represent a credible threat until the emergence of the Sassanids in AD 226.  
49
 Stephen Dryson, “Native Revolts in the Roman Empire,” Historia 20 (1971): 239-74. 
50
 Galula 1964, 1-5. 
51
 Luttwak 1976, 41. 
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productive and relatively peaceful province for the next sixty years.52  This outcome was no 
accident.  In the words of Jonathan Roth, “Caesar realized winning the war was generally less 
important than winning the peace.”53  Through winning this peace, Roman practice evidenced 
advanced anti-guerilla techniques, concern for governmental legitimacy, and an overriding trend 
of population-centrism.         
       
iv. Caveats and significance 
Any argument which incorporates two distinct periods of history must navigate serious 
pitfalls.  This statement is doubly true when one of those periods concerns ancient Rome.  In the 
past decade, Roman-American comparisons have become an absurd and endemic feature of U.S. 
political discourse.  Cable news personalities draw contrasts between the imperial excesses of 
gladiatorial combat and MTV, while prominent intellectuals suggest American “decline” can be 
averted by studying the collapse of the Western Roman Empire.54  As one example, Cullen 
Murphy’s 2007 Are We Rome? closely approximates Rome and America’s global military 
commitment and reliance on soft power.55  Other superficial likenesses have been found in the 
two powers’ love of spectacle, maritime dominance, and even their highway systems.56 Such 
                                               
52
 Roth 2009, 112. 
53
 Ibid, 106. 
54
 Vaclav Smil, Why America is Not a New Rome (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010), x. 
55
 Cullen Murphy, Are We Rome? The Fall of an Empire and the Fate of America (New York: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 2007), 71-73. 
56
 Smil 2010, 157-158. 
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strained parallels are hardly a new phenomenon; indeed, Rome has remained a fixture of the 
Western imagination for centuries.57   
Nearly all of these comparisons are ill-founded at best and revisionist at worst.  
Disregarding the obvious technological divide (a Roman gladius is not an M1 Abrams), the 
realities of Roman thinking are simply not communicable those of the modern day.  The Roman 
Empire existed long before the emergence of nation-states: there were no clearly delineated 
borders, nor even understanding of basic geography.58  Moreover, Roman values were entirely 
devoid of contemporary notions of liberalism.  Prestige and victory reigned supreme; human life 
was cheap and notoriously expendable.59  It speaks volumes that, despite a slave population 
which blossomed into the millions, almost no challenge to slavery as an institution can be found 
in all of antiquity.60  In the words of Vaclav Smil, “A systemic appraisal of fundamental realities 
[between Rome and America] exposes truly profound differences that make casual comparisons 
of the two empires at best misplaced but more often irrelevant.”61  Such parallels may be 
entertaining, but they have little place in serious academic inquiry. 
Accordingly, while this study contrasts Roman counterinsurgency practice with 
contemporary theory, it draws few comparisons between particular ancient and modern 
engagements.  It would be misguided, for instance, to assess AD 2004’s Second Battle of 
Fallujah in the context of AD 60’s siege of Jerusalem.  While certain similarities exist in the 
                                               
57
 C. Edwards and G. Woolf, “Cosmopolis: Rome as world city,” in Rome the Cosmopolis, ed. C. Edwards 
and G. Woolf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1-20. 
58
 G. Woolf, “Roman peace,” in War and society in the Roman world, ed. J. Rich and G. Shipley (London: 
Routledge, 1993): 171-194, 179; Susan Mattern, Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the 
Principate (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 24. 
59
 Mattern 1990, 22. 
60
 David Brion Davis, Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the New World (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 44; Keith Bradley, “Review Article: The Problem of Slavery in Classical 
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operational intent of a U.S. Soldier or Marine and that of a Roman legionnaire, the gulf in 
mindset and tactics is wide enough to render any more specific exercise moot.  It may be 
possible to appreciate and even learn from Roman behavior, but it will never make sense to 
emulate it.  The divide between civilizations is simply too vast.  Just as Polybius concluded that 
Roman ascent was “An event completely without precedent in the past,” neither does it enjoy an 
accurate parallel among the powers of today.62 
  If this study has little place in the “Rome and America” brand of pop literature, however, 
it still occupies an important gap between classical inquiry and military-scientific assessment.  
Despite Rome’s suitability as an ancient counterinsurgent practitioner, scholarship in this area is 
remarkably sparse.  Only one work – an essay by Susan Mattern entitled “Counterinsurgency and 
the Enemies of Rome” – confronts the relationship between ancient practice and contemporary 
doctrine directly.63  While an excellent start, this piece is short and intended as only a 
rudimentary introduction to the topic.  Other scholarship targeted toward particular episodes in 
Roman history makes use of the term “insurgent,” but usually as a synonym for “guerilla,” and 
without attributing it to the more specific definition propagated by theorists like Galula.64  This 
linkage demands additional research.  Such an examination holds potential for both classicists’ 
understanding of Roman occupation and modern theorists’ understanding of counterinsurgency’s 
doctrinal evolution. 
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 The potential for military-scientific inquiry to spur new developments among Roman 
historians is already a well-attested phenomenon.  In 1976, Luttwak published his boldly titled 
study, Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire.  Its intent was nothing less than the wholesale 
systemization of Roman security strategy and statecraft, based on a handful of primary sources 
and a scattering of archaeological ruins.65  Anticipating a backlash, the book’s foreword had 
conceded that, “Specialists will doubtless find errors or disagree with [these] conclusions.”66  
This is exactly what happened.  Luttwak’s sweeping hypothesis concerning Roman frontier 
systems has been alternately critiqued and derided ever since.67  Yet these attempts to rebut 
Luttwak’s claims have produced a stunning series of archaeological and conceptual 
breakthroughs in the past three decades.  Understanding of Roman frontier policy is now 
appreciably better than it was at the time of Luttwak’s manuscript.  The spark of a similar debate 
concerning Roman occupation practice might do much to aid understanding of how Rome 
interacted with her peacetime populations and dissuaded potential belligerents. 
   This study may also refine counterinsurgency’s wider historical context.  Popular 
conception sees insurgency and counterinsurgent response emerging in their current iterations 
only very recently.  According to FM 3-24, “Before World War I, insurgencies were mostly 
conservative; insurgents were usually concerned with hearth, home, monarchies, and traditional 
religion.  Governments were seldom able to defeat these insurgencies; violence would recur 
                                               
65
 Luttwak 1976, 1-5. 
66
 J.F. Gillian, foreword to Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, by Edward Luttwak (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1976), x. 
67
 For a very small sampling of this debate, see E. Wheeler, “Methodological Limits and the Mirage of 
Roman Strategy,” 2 parts.  Journal of Military History 57 (1993): 7-41; 215-240 and Peter J. Heather, 
“Holding the Line: Frontier Defense and the Later Roman Empire,” in Makers of Ancient Strategy: From 
the Persian Wars to the Fall of Rome, ed. Victor Davis Hanson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2010): 227-247. 
17 
 
when conditions favored a rebellion.”68  While FM 3-24 is a handbook, not an academic paper, 
this summary is broadly reflective of most theorists’ understanding of ancient counterinsurgency. 
If the dual propositions of this study are correct, however, such a far-reaching statement requires 
refinement.  Sources can go decades after a Roman counterinsurgent response without attesting 
to renewed revolt in a target province.  At least in the case of Judaea, there is reason to believe 
that such long and peaceful silence mirrored reality of the day.69  Allowing for the universality of 
violence in the Roman experience (death by brigands was considered as common a cause of 
death as sickness and old age), Roman practice likely averted more serious incidents of unrest 
and revolt.70  Consequently, it may no longer be sufficient to dismiss all pre-1914 
counterinsurgency without additional examination. 
 Ultimately, the greatest significance of this study lies in the continuing relevancy of the 
theory it seeks to parse and apply.  Since the 2001 American invasion of Afghanistan, 
counterinsurgency studies and literature have proliferated.  Future conflicts are increasingly 
viewed through the lens of contemporary challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan.  U.S. Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates, for instance, has urged a realignment of American military development 
toward those of irregular, low-intensity threats.71  The threat of the next big war is waning; future 
security challenges may depend as much on the winning of hearts and minds as on the merits of 
air supremacy or maneuver warfare.  Accordingly, it seems a far from worthless exercise to 
investigate distant counterinsurgency precedent in light of modern conception and development.  
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The operations of the first and twenty-first centuries may be different, but they are not as 
different as we think. 
 
v. Research design 
 The remainder of this study consists of four parts.  These sections present a thorough 
exploration of the context, practice, and theoretical grounding of Rome’s insurgency challenge 
and counterinsurgent response: an exploration of wider Roman history and relevant 
socioeconomic, military, and cultural trends; an examination of fourteen insurgency-related 
instances preceding AD 72; an analysis of these broad patterns and specific episodes through the 
lens of modern theory and ancient reality; and a conclusive summary of findings. 
 Following this Introduction, Part II will define the wider framework within which Roman 
counterinsurgency functioned.  It will begin with a brief overview of Rome’s historical timeline.  
From there, it will elucidate elements of Rome’s so-called “grand strategy:” her economic 
motivators, security conceptions, and underlying values system.  This will be followed by an 
illumination of the capabilities and development of the Roman army, in light of both its war-
fighting and occupational roles.  Finally, this section will investigate the phenomenon of 
Romanization, considering its mechanisms of operation and effect on subject populations. 
 Part III will present a wide-ranging selection of insurgencies drawn from antiquity and 
ordered by the nature of the Roman response.  Earliest cases offer Rome’s first serious 
insurgency challenges: the Second Punic War of 218-202 BC, The Fourth Macedonian War of 
150-148 BC, and the combined Lusitanian and Numantine Wars of 155-133 BC.  From there, 
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two traumatic Italy-based insurgencies will be examined, the Social War of 91-88 BC and Third 
Servile War of 73-71 BC.  Moving on, common themes among Rome’s provincial revolts will be 
revealed: the revolt of Vercingetorix in 52 BC, the Dalmatian and Pannonian Revolts of AD 7, 
the revolt of Florus and Sacrovir in 21 AD, the revolt of Tacfarinas in AD 15-24, the revolt of 
Boudicca in 60/61 AD, and the Batavian revolt of AD 69-70.  Next will be discussed two 
insurgency situations settled by unusual means: the revolt of Arminius and Battle of Teutoburg 
Forest in AD 9 and first-century AD relationship with the bandits of Mauretania and Iusaria.  
Finally, the Jewish War of AD 66-72 – our best documented insurgency in Roman history – will 
be explored in depth. 
 Part IV will apply the precepts of contemporary counterinsurgency theory to Roman 
practice exhibited in Part III and informed by the overriding factors of Part II.  Both of this 
study’s foundational propositions will be addressed.  These verdicts will be contrasted with the 
likely understanding of actual Roman practitioners: how did Rome conceive “insurgency” as 
distinct from other provincial disturbances, and to what extent did Rome engineer a conscious 
“counterinsurgency” response?  The answers to these questions will complete the development 
of a comprehensive historical, theoretical, and practical framework for Rome’s insurgency 
challenge and counterinsurgent response. 
 Part V will offer a summary of findings and a brief meditation on the broader 
significance of this study.  While this paper’s principle focus is the proof of its dual propositions, 
this is not its only focus; attempts will also be made to establish Rome’s place in a broader 
heritage of successful counterinsurgent powers. 
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 A word on chronology.  While well attested instances of revolt persist through Roman 
history until the loss of literary sources in AD 235, this study has chosen to end with the 
conclusion of the Jewish War in AD 72.72  Events beyond this date may be discussed, but they do 
comprise points of serious investigation.  From the perspective of ancient revolts, this boundary 
encapsulates the two best-recorded rebellions – the war of Vercingetorix via Caesar and the 
Jewish War via Josephus – while also including instances of insurgency in nearly every part of 
the Roman Empire.  That said, Roman counterinsurgency did not end in AD 72, and further 
research would do well to investigate major policy shifts and insurgency episodes of the early-to-
mid second century.          
 
II. CONTEXT 
i. Historical Overview 
  Although this study principally concerns the counterinsurgency practice and 
development of Rome from the start of the Second Punic War in 218 BC to the conclusion of the 
Jewish Wars nearly 300 years later, it is important to understand the place of these events in the 
wider arc of Roman military history.  Rome’s rise was hardly inevitable, and her decline was far 
from fated.  According to Livy, Rome was founded in the year 753 BC by two brothers, Romulus 
and Remus, after having been reared and suckled by a she-wolf.73  While not possible to assess 
the veracity of these claims (Livy did not begin writing his history until the 20s BC), 
archaeological evidence suggests that the hills of Rome were inhabited by the late Bronze Age, 
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c. 1000 BC.74  For many centuries, Italy was a web of small city-states; among them, Rome was 
neither unique nor particularly powerful.  With Rome’s conquest of the neighboring city of Veii 
in 400 BC, however, her fortunes began to change.75  Increased reserves of material and 
manpower were coupled with the innovative military reforms of Camillus, permitting the 
creation of the powerful Republican army.76  These advances broke the deadlock on the Italian 
peninsula, and Rome began to absorb cities farther and farther afield.  By 270 BC, Rome was the 
undisputed master of Italy.77 
 War had become an annual exercise for Rome and her allies.  According to the Oxford 
Classical Dictionary, “It was inevitable that, after completing the conquest of peninsular Italy, 
the Romans would embark on military adventures beyond its borders.”78  Such adventures were 
inaugurated by Rome’s 262 BC challenge to Carthage, the great North African naval power, over 
control of Sicily.79  The resulting struggle raged for much of the next sixty years.  It saw the 
emergence of the Roman navy, the famous campaigns of Hannibal, and huge Roman gains in 
Sicily and Iberia.80  Throughout this period, Rome also launched expeditions north against the 
Gauls and east against the Illyrians and Macedonians.81  The momentous year 146 BC witnessed 
the destruction of Carthage in the Third Punic War and effective absorption of Greece and 
Macedonia through the defeat of the Achaean League.82  Further gains in the late second century 
BC included the incorporation of North Africa, Iberia, and Asia Minor and deepening incursion 
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into Europe.  Conceptions of empire (or imperium, meaning “power asserted”) became 
increasingly common.83  As Rome’s dominion expanded, she came into contact with new powers 
– which, in turn, provided targets for further conquest. 
 Yet for all of Rome’s success, she became undermined by powerful social and economic 
forces at home.  Thanks to victories abroad, hundreds of thousands of fresh slaves had streamed 
into farming estates of the rich, displacing the traditional small-time Italian farmer and creating a 
new class of unemployed and discontented city-dwellers.84  With a diminishing pool of Roman 
landowners, the Republican army – with land ownership a foundational requirement of service – 
was drawing fewer and fewer recruits.  This challenge was addressed by the consul Marius, 
whose series of reforms led to the creation of a volunteer, semi-professional Roman army with 
regularized payment and dates of service.85  However, Marius’ changes also marked a shift in 
focus from the glorification of the Republic to the glorification of individual commanders; with 
soldiers now serving far from home and for years at a time, service to the Republic was 
becoming an increasingly abstract notion.86  Powerful men armed with loyal legions began to 
challenge each other for control of the Roman state: Marius and Sulla, Sulla and Pompey, 
Pompey and Caesar, and – most critically – Mark Antony and Octavian Augustus.87 
 Augustus’ victory over Antony in 31 BC’s Battle of Actium spelled a decisive shift in the 
course of Roman history.  Through a skillful series of settlements, Augustus transformed the 
complicated power distribution of the Republic into a virtual monarchy.88  He further 
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standardized the Roman army, and – especially following the traumatic loss of three Roman 
legions in the Battle of Teutoburg Forest in AD 9 – focused as much on territorial consolidation 
as on any new gains.89  The threat of this period was not foreign invasion, but internal revolt: the 
first century and second centuries AD saw many insurrections, but far fewer wars of conquest.  
Rome had reached the limits of those populations she could effectively subjugate and control.90  
Where Rome annexed new territory, it was now typically that of previous satellites or affiliates.91  
Unfortunately, this practice saddled Rome with mounting imperial commitment, necessitating 
additional troops and more sophisticated border protections.92  By the turn of the second century 
AD, Rome’s situation was much analogous to that of the British Empire at the turn of the 
nineteenth, in which Britain buckled under the weight of maintaining her “formal” empire after 
being forced to absorb her “informal’” one.93  Meanwhile, the Germans to the north and Persians 
to the east grew steadily stronger.94  
 These troubles were exacerbated by a reemergence of civil war.  The years AD 235 to 
284 saw no less than eighteen emperors, almost all of whom had to defeat multiple claimants to 
the purple before being killed in turn.95  This strife was coupled with unprecedented external 
attack: in the year AD 260, for instance, Rome (without a sitting emperor) faced a massive 
Persian invasion and German incursion deep into Gaul.96  Despite these grave dangers, Rome 
was able to recover.  In AD 285, the emperor Diocletian split administration of the empire into 
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East and West.  This shift allowed for two rulers, and – at least in theory – encouraged 
collaboration in handling foreign threats.97  Although this system operated with moderate success 
until AD 337, thereafter competition between various heirs and usurpers plunged the empire into 
renewed anarchy.  While the Eastern Empire would persist until AD 1453, the West had entered 
a downward spiral.98  Rome increasingly relied on German mercenaries (federates) to ensure her 
security, ceding massive amounts of land to these barbarians in payment.99  By AD 455, Roman 
control was restricted to Italy.  By AD 476, a leader of the federates deposed the Roman 
emperor, and the Western Roman Empire effectively ceased to exist.100  
 This overview suggests that, after 146 BC, the empire’s largest threats were very often 
internal.  In the first century BC and third century AD, the danger was civil war; it the first and 
second centuries AD, it was revolt.  Even Rome’s decline, popularly associated with images of 
barbarian hordes sweeping across Europe, was largely a consequence of provincial disunion and 
unrest.101  Accordingly, the control and policing of target populations would have remained a 
pressing concern for generations of Roman statesmen and military practitioners.  Their resultant 
policy prescriptions – their counterinsurgency doctrine – would have been reflected and 
informed by three broad factors: Roman grand strategy, the capabilities and development of the 
army, and the cultural phenomenon of Romanization.  It is to these categories that this study now 
turns. 
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ii. Grand Strategy 
 A study of the evolution of Roman grand strategy illuminates how Rome viewed her 
growing imperial obligation – and, by extension, why she developed the counterinsurgency 
practice she did.  That said, “Grand Strategy” is a difficult and abstract concept, and one whose 
applicability to the Roman Empire some scholars have brought into serious question.102  Paul 
Kennedy defines grand strategy as, “The integration of a state’s overall political, economic, and 
military aims, both in peace and war, to preserve long-term interests, including the management 
of ends and means, diplomacy, and national morale and political culture in both the military and 
civilian spheres.”103  In one sense, Kennedy’s definition suggests an administrative and political 
cohesion which ancient Rome obviously lacked.  Rome had no general staff and limited 
institutional memory.104  There were no treatises of “lessons learned,” or formalized education in 
the art of statecraft.  The empire may have possessed a centralized command structure, but with 
communication taking weeks and mobilization taking far longer, Rome was unequipped to enact 
a sophisticated strategic agenda; it remained a fundamentally reactive power.105   
Yet in other ways, the characterization is accurate.  As Kimberly Kagan observes, “To 
say that the Roman Empire had no grand strategy because it had no long-term plan is to define 
the concept incorrectly and condemn the field of grand strategy for all time.”106  Rome had 
objectives which transcended the whims of individual emperors, and broad principles toward 
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which she consistently directed her impressive force.  These principles were guided by three 
grand-strategic motivators: economy, security, and values.  Each offers a different perspective on 
Rome’s development, as well as a different contextualization of her counterinsurgent duties. 
a. Economy 
 In many ways, Rome’s early forays into foreign conquest were less a consequence of 
imperial ambition than aristocratic competition.107  Under the Republican system, a successful 
war promised a magnificent triumph (to win the favor of the people), recognition from the Senate 
(to win powerful political capital), and fabulous personal wealth (to live out a happy old age).108  
The staggering financial gain from some conflicts was enough to affect permanent shifts in the 
power distribution of the Roman state.  Scipio Aemilianus’ sacking of Carthage at the conclusion 
of the Third Punic War gained him a fabulous fortune and ensured his place as Rome’s premiere 
statesman.109  Meanwhile, it was Caesar’s famous Gallic campaigns which won him the riches to 
assert his famous dictatorship, and it was those same riches which laid the foundation of 
Augustus’ rise to power.110  Such individual treasure-seeking was the de facto policy of the 
Roman state; according to Guideo Clemente, “The Roman government was, especially in the 
Republican period…not an organism capable of extrapolating and isolating its general and 
theoretical economic objectives from those of the same groups which dominated [it].”111 
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 Gradually, however, Rome’s inclination to “loot and leave” was challenged by mounting 
imperial obligation.  A region emptied of valuables was not emptied of people; native inhabitants 
might pose threat to future Roman operations unless properly subdued.  The Romans hated these 
early pacification campaigns.  In 149 BC – at a time when volunteers were racing for the 
opportunity to participate in the Third Punic War – widespread rioting took place at the thought 
of serving in poor, revolt-infested Iberia.112  The incongruity of a plunder-based economy and 
province-sized responsibilities would become increasingly apparent.  In the judgment of 
Wolfgang Rubinsohn: 
Roman unwillingness to undertake systemical military and administrative obligations caused the new, post-
167 BC ‘Roman Order’ to destabilize the areas it affected, thereby providing fertile breeding ground for a 
nostalgia for a largely illusionary happy past, which found its expression in resistance movements.  An 
adequate solution of economic and public-security problems could have saved much misery and bloodshed, 
but in the end only the Principate proved equal to this task.113 
After Rome’s first foray into Greece and Macedonia in 200 BC, she withdrew her entire force 
without garrison or binding treaty.114  By 146 BC, however, it had become clear that peace (and 
the opportunity for future economic gains) could only be guaranteed through direct occupation 
and eventual administration.115  
 While the civil wars of the first century BC delayed this administrative transformation, 
they could not stop it.  With Augustus’ founding of the Principate in 27 BC, Rome rapidly 
transitioned from a conquest state to a tributary empire.116  In provinces across the Roman 
dominion, irregular exactions of wealth were replaced by regular tax collection and census-
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taking.117  This shift in Rome’s economic model also marked a decisive shift in her relationship 
with the provinces.  No longer were foreign peoples simply targets for conquest and periodic 
shake-downs; now they were populations whose allegiance to Rome was necessary for the 
empire’s continuing existence.  The religious oaths associated with the fourteen-year census 
attest to the seriousness of this dependence.118  Counterinsurgency operations were now not just 
a pain, but a necessity.  Any disturbance that threatened flow of money to the imperial coffers 
could not be tolerated, and sanctity of the empire became central to Roman strategy.  In the 
words of Florus, “It is more difficult to govern a province than to acquire one: for they are 
conquered by force, but they must be retained by law.”119 
 Rome’s reliance on her provinces – and her imperative to keep them safe and secure – is 
best illustrated by what happened when these efforts finally failed.  The late fourth-century 
emperor Theodosius, not wanting to levy legions from his tax base (and hence reduce revenue), 
permitted the increased hiring of federates in legionnaires’ place.120  However, this growing 
barbarian presence led to mounting unrest and disrupted tax collection in much of the empire.121  
Consequently, “In a kind of vicious circle the system further reduce tax revenues and funding for 
the Roman regular army and led to the replacement of regulars with still more federates because 
the regulars could no longer be kept up to strength.”122  Although Rome had neither sought nor 
easily accepted a tax-based economy, by the late Principate she had grown to be entirely 
dependent on one.  Its collapse would spell the rapid diminution of the Western Roman Empire.    
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b. Security 
 Key to an understanding of Roman grand strategy is an appreciation for the persistent 
paranoia that inhabited the Roman psyche.  To the policymakers in Italy, all peoples outside the 
provinces (and many in them) were faceless enemies in the process of biding their time.123  Such 
bias dated to as early as the Gallic invasion and occupation of Rome in 387 BC.  This event was 
deeply traumatic for the Rome’s historical consciousness; according to Livy, “[The survivors] 
became hardened by misery, and turned their thoughts…to the sword in their right hands, which 
they gazed upon as the only things left to give them hope.”124  In consequence, security was a 
chief obsession for every generation of Roman policymakers, and the casus belli of conflicts 
across every frontier of the empire often became the preemption of nonexistent or contrived 
threats.125  Many “defensive” wars were conceived with notably offensive aims. 
 These security conceptions were further complicated by the fact that, for much of the 
empire, Rome recognized no established frontier.  Cicero, speaking of Roman-administered 
Macedonia, characterized it as “a land which has on its borders so many tribes of barbarians that 
its commanders…have always had only just those boundaries which were also the boundaries of 
their swords and javelins.”126  A province was not necessarily considered part of the empire.  To 
some observers, for instance, the revolts in Dalmatia and Pannonia AD 9 and Judaea in AD 69 
constituted “foreign” wars.127  Conversely, however, conceptions of Roman imperium could far 
outrange her tax collectors and local garrisons.  As early as the second century BC, statesmen 
had no qualms issuing orders – and receiving results – from distant states otherwise independent 
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from Roman rule.128  At the end of his reign, Augustus spoke in the same breath of limiting his 
empire to the Danube River and exercising his control over the Dacians who lay beyond it.129  
Similarly, he took pains to emphasize the subservient embassies he had received from as far 
afield as India, implying his power over such territory.130  Rome asserted suzerainty over 
boundless tracts of land, some of which had never seen the boot of one Roman legionnaire.131 
 Even with the emergence of increasingly defined border fortifications, broader Roman 
perceptions of the world changed little.  Hadrian’s Wall may have divided Britain and the vast 
limes traced the Rhine frontier, but such structures were directed as much toward internal 
stability as toward drawing a line between all things Roman and all things beyond her grasp.132  
Commerce was common beyond such barriers, and the army still regularly penetrated regions far 
removed from this zone.133  Roman power recognized no easy limits.  According to Greg Woolf, 
“Romans did not conceive of the world as a mosaic of sovereign territories, and thought in terms 
of peoples and places rather than states and spaces, connected not so much by frontiers and 
international law as by routes and a variety of relationships with Rome.”134  This contemporary 
analysis is echoed by the stark language of a much older one, and one which betrays Roman 
perceptions of the empire’s dominion.  In the words of fourth-century AD statesman 
Symmachus, “For who does not equate the judgment of our emperors with that of the entire 
world?”135 
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 The implications of this view are astounding, creating a situation in which Rome could 
conceivably view any disturbance – in any location – as a direct threat to the survival of the 
Roman state.  In fact, this is much the method by which the Roman peace functioned.  A 
challenge to Roman power might meet with initial success (the legions were scarce and often 
scattered), yet such action set the agitator beneath a sword of Damocles.  Slowly and unfailingly, 
Rome would gather her legions to exact reprisal and avenge her injury a hundred-fold.136  The 
hammer blow might take years to fall, yet few could doubt the end result: Roman retaliation was 
one of the terrible certainties of the ancient world.137  Given the remarkable range of actions 
which could spark this punitive response, it is little wonder that some tribes sent embassies to 
Rome to offer preemptive surrenders, often begging the emperor to accept their subordinate 
position.138 
 Rome’s security, therefore, was grounded in deterrence.  In Luttwak’s judgment, “Above 
all, the Romans clearly realized that the dominant dimension of power was not physical but 
psychological – the product of others’ perceptions of Roman strength rather than the use of this 
strength.”139  Rome’s horrific treatment of rebels and other instigators has long been regarded as 
a central aspect of imperial practice.140  Less appreciated is the fact that, through these brutal 
demonstrations of Roman might, the empire dissuaded countless other incursions and 
disturbances from occurring in the first place.  Rome demanded respect based on superiority of 
force, and used awe and terror to cull both provincial residents and distant barbarians into 
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submission.141  This focus on the psychological impact of military operations would become a 
staple of Roman grand strategy.142  As this study will reveal, this overarching strategic concept 
would also help direct the population-centrism crucial to Rome’s counterinsurgency practice.  
c. Values 
 The last determinant of Roman grand strategy was the distinct values system that 
permeated the lives of Rome’s elite.  As has been observed earlier, the Republic was rife with 
aristocratic competition, and wars abroad served as a means toward domestic advantage.  Yet the 
reason for war’s political significance – far and above its economic benefit – was due to the 
central role of victory in Roman society.143  Embodied by the goddess Victoria, notions of 
military success were closely tied to conceptions of religious piety.  A campaigning general 
became a conduit for the gods, and a winning general was one who approached the status of 
demigod.144  With the adoption of the Principate, conflict and victory became the exclusive 
domain of the emperor.  Governors and legates were heavily restricted in their ability to wage 
war without imperial consent.145  Even when these men did conduct a campaign and win a 
victory, it was the emperor who took the credit.146  This did nothing to stem Victoria’s 
popularity; throughout the Principate, hers was an overwhelmingly popular portrayal in literature 
and coinage.147  Victory offered a foundational Roman virtue, an expression of Roman might, 
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and – most significantly – the glue which bound Rome’s fifty-million inhabitants to their 
government and emperor.148 
 In understanding the centrism of such values to the Roman experience, it is revealing to 
examine the character and education of its decision makers. Amazingly, elites of both Republic 
and Principate knew very little about the fields of geography, history, and military science, and 
only rarely did they seek to consult those who knew more.149  Reliance on experts, as when the 
emperor Claudius consulted learned freedmen, could be heavily criticized.150  Instead, most 
Romans in positions of authority were trained as rhetoricians in the Greek style.151  According to 
R. Syme, “Verse or prose, the ornamental or the obsolete prevails throughout the centuries, the 
rule of the Caesars reinforcing habits engrained in the educated class.  An imperial people had 
little use for geography.”152  Marius famously derided those noblemen who, elected to consul, 
tried to learn generalship by acquainting themselves with Greek histories and military 
manuals.153  Implicit in all this is the fact that the most powerful armies in the Western world 
were commanded by men more at home with the virtues of Homeric heroes than the precepts of 
good martial practice.  They were literary scholars tasked with making war; it should come as no 
surprise, then, that the fulfillment of abstract values occupied such an important role in the 
formulation of Roman strategy. 
 If this values system assigned preeminence to the power of inherent Victoria, it also 
neutralized challenges to Roman might and abhorred the thought of weakness.  In the natural 
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order of things, Rome was “superior” – this perception was attested to by peoples outside the 
empire as well as those within it.154  Consequently, Romans understood that their superior state 
could never acknowledge defeat or entreat with others as equals without losing this coveted 
status.  Such sentiment was captured by notions of decus, or national “face.”155  Rome’s 
supremacy had to remain unassailable in all settlements; there was never a proper treaty unless 
the other party was cowed and terrified by Roman power.156  Surrenders were always to be 
unconditional.157  A peace negotiated with the Numantines by the consul Quintus Pompeius in 
140 BC, for instance, was famously annulled by the Senate for having offered terms in 
advance.158  Similarly, although Rome frequently took hostages to enforce peace provisions and 
instruct them in the Roman manner, there is absolutely no evidence that Rome ever reciprocated 
with hostages of her own.159  Tribute was granted with great rarity, but demanded regularly.160  
Even continuing territorial acquisitions in Britain and Mesopotamia, never profitable or 
strategically viable provinces, can best be understood as an unwillingness to abandon ventures 
already started and hence risk the appearance of weakness.161  
 In studying the course of Roman strategy, modern observers – immersed in today’s world 
of splintered beliefs and secular rationalism – might be inclined to discount the impact of 
abstract values on the policy formulation of the Roman state.  This tendency is understandable 
but mistaken.  In ancient times, the supply of books was limited; the selection even more so.  For 
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much of the empire’s existence, religion offered a source of unity, not division.  Cultural 
mediums were few, and nearly all were monopolized by the emperor.162  There was not even a 
conception of “morality” distinct from the demands of Roman prestige.163  Mattern puts it best: 
In each case we find that Roman thought on what seem to be the most practical questions involves issues of 
status or morality - thus the emphasis on terror and vengeance in Roman military strategy, or the powerful 
symbolism of dominance and submission, honor and deference that was attached to the collection of 
tribute.164 
Roman values, embodied by the veneration and relentless pursuit of Victoria, exercised a 
powerful influence on how Rome perceived both her empire and the world around her.  Coupled 
with an economy dependent on provincial stability and security based on deterrence and 
disproportionate reprisal, it becomes clear that insurgency posed a dangerous threat.  An 
unanswered revolt might undermine the tax base, compromise Roman inviolability, and pose an 
unacceptable attack on Rome’s self-image.  Accordingly, the neutralization of insurgency 
presented a serious challenge across successive generations of Roman policymakers.        
 
iii. Army 
 Rome’s success began and ended with her conventional superiority in force of arms.  
Contrary to popular belief, this was not due to special Roman elan (legionnaires were less heroic 
Spartans than working professionals), nor to Rome’s technical edge (Roman equipment was 
often inferior to that of her opponents).165  Instead, Roman prowess can be best attributed to the 
stable institutions and methodological consistency of her armies.  Pyrrhus of Epirus may have 
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been able to defeat individual Republican deployments, but he could not defeat a system that – 
like clockwork – assembled a new consular army every season.166  Similarly, while it was 
relatively easy for German tribes to harass and evade a slow-moving imperial legion, it was 
nearly impossible to defend a fixed position against Rome’s sophisticated siege practice and 
engineering prowess.167  Roman operations were less blitzkrieg than bulldozer, applying gradual 
increments of force until the objective was either subdued or destroyed.168  The Roman army was 
slow, plodding, and undeniably effective. 
     This assessment becomes more complicated if the army is also considered in its role as 
a force of occupation and development.  Large-scale battles were uncommon occurrences in the 
Principate; for many regions, the Roman army was as much intended to ensure internal stability 
to check external threats.  As the centuries passed, the army’s focus would shift more and more  
toward these policing efforts, eventually ceding its high-intensity capability altogether.  An 
understanding of the Roman army’s counterinsurgency effectiveness, therefore, requires an 
appreciation of these three aspects: the army’s military power, its occupational role, and the 
evolution which eventually blurred these two functions. 
 
 
a. The army at war 
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   It is important to appreciate Rome’s military development in the context of her 
contemporary rivals.  For many centuries, it was the Greek hoplite’s long spear and protective 
phalanx formed the foundation of ancient warfare across the Mediterranean.169  Such military 
organization was perfected by the Macedonians, whose armies under Alexander the Great were 
able to defeat the whole of the Persian Empire in a period of ten years.  Macedonian phalanges 
(heavy infantry) – with spears extending as much as sixteen feet – were deployed alongside 
skirmishers and cavalry in a potent use of combined arms.170  Opposing hoplite armies, unable to 
penetrate this bristling spear wall and subject to missile fire on their flanks, could offer little 
resistance.  The Macedonian model permeated both the Western Mediterranean and the 
kingdoms of Alexander’s Hellenistic successors as states from Carthage to Babylon all adopted 
roughly similar styles of warfare.171  Battles between phalanxes are best imagined as shoving 
matches decided by grit and ending in a retirement.172  Casualties were not catastrophic: 
historians suggest a 5 percent loss for the victors and 14 percent for the defeated army, which 
was able to affect a relatively bloodless retreat.173  This was just as well; limited population pools 
meant that high battle death could devastate or eradicate entire city-states.174     
 Rome’s military development followed a very different track.  While the early Republic 
was as reliant on hoplites as its neighbors to the east, the Camillian Reforms of the fourth-
century BC set the Roman military in a new direction.175  Large and ponderous phalanx 
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formations were supplanted by battle lines of self-contained and tactically flexible units.176  Over 
time, the spear was discarded in favor of the short, stabbing gladius.177  Meanwhile, a heavy 
throwing javelin (the pilum) became an integral part of each infantryman’s arsenal.178  These 
changes, while ceding the defensive benefit of a tight phalanx formation, greatly enhanced the 
combat effectiveness of individual legionnaires.  Further innovations, culminating with the 
Marian Reforms of the first-century BC, resulted in widespread eligibility for military service, 
equipment standardization, and the emergence of a semi-professional fighting force.179  
Understanding her material and technical limitations (Romans were notoriously poor archers and 
horsemen), Rome outsourced support roles to her provinces and satellite states.180  This resulted 
in the emergence of the auxilia, semi-autonomous units which provided both combined arms and 
enhanced numbers to the Roman regulars.181  By the time of the Principate, a typical Roman 
legion – of which a relatively constant thirty would exist for the next 300 years – consisted of 
4,800 legionnaires reinforced by roughly as many auxilia and additional detachments of 
cavalry.182 
 The superiority of the Roman model was demonstrated in 197 BC’s Battle of 
Cynoscephalae between a Roman consular army and a Macedonian force under King Philip V.  
As the two armies closed, the fully formed Macedonian right showed success, “their arms…more 
suited for the actual conditions of the struggle.”183  The Macedonian left, however, was unable to 
assemble its complicated phalanx before meeting the Roman line and was subsequently 
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scattered.184  Even as the Romans chased these retreating phalanges, they rapidly reoriented to 
roll up the Macedonian right.  As Polybius observed, “The nature of the phalanx is such that the 
men cannot face round singly and defend themselves”; assailed on multiple fronts, the right’s 
advantage was neutralized and its soldiers routed.185  Unlike the Hellenes, the Romans were 
much more capable of punishing a fleeing enemy.  The Macedonian army at Cynoscephalae was 
annihilated, reflective of wider Roman military practice in which half an opposing army was 
often captured or slain.186  If Roman force and flexibility were able to decimate the premiere 
military in the West, they had even less trouble against the tribal tactics of European 
barbarians.187  Writing from the fifth-century AD, Vegetius smugly observed in his De Re 
Militari that it took only a small number of Romans to triumph against any larger force in the 
known world.188  
 Also unique was the extent to which Rome incorporated engineering into her military 
arsenal.  The legionary marching camp, in which an elaborate and uniformly designed fort was 
constructed at the end of each day’s march, was a ubiquitous element of the Roman army.189  
According to Luttwak:  
[While] the strategic mobility of Roman forces was undoubtedly reduced by this tiring and time-consuming 
camp-building routine…[it] combined the tactical advantages of a bivouac with the convenience of billets, 
and had the added benefit of a guarded perimeter that could always be turned into a heavily fortified 
earthwork given more time and labor.  The characteristically Roman institution of the marching camp was a 
crucial factor in the strength of an army whose peculiar quality was always resilience under stress.190 
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The army had no porters or special construction crews; instead, every soldier was also trained as 
a builder and rudimentary engineer.191  Rome also demonstrated a mastery of siege warfare.  
Circumvallation – in which fortifications were erected around an enemy’s walls to prevent 
reinforcement and resupply – was a frequent Roman procedure.192  Even on the open battlefield, 
Rome’s pioneering use of artillery testified to her ingenuity and engineering prowess.193  Giant 
bolts and heavy boulders decimated enemy armies from afar, forcing their initiative and 
demoralizing their men.  Ultimately, these practices suggest a mindset which minimized 
casualties at the cost of increased effort and time investment.  As one Roman general intoned, it 
was better to win victories by the shovel than the sword.194   
 Rome’s tactical proficiency and unique engineering capabilities made her an undisputed 
master of high-intensity warfare.  In a pitched battle situation, Rome enjoyed powerful 
advantage.  Her small and flexible units could react quickly to changing battlefield conditions, 
exploiting openings unavailable to her more rigid and less disciplined opponents.  If the enemy 
avoided confrontation and instead retreated to supposedly inviolable strongholds, Rome’s task 
became only easier as she reduced her adversary through siege and starvation.  In Luttwak’s 
judgment, “As the degree of force concentration and combat-intensity increased, so did the 
tactical superiority of the Romans.”195  So long as Rome’s opponents had fixed assets to defend, 
they remained vulnerable to the might of the legions.196  Yet this conventional advantage was 
severely diminished against nomadic tribes or unanchored insurgents; utilizing guerilla tactics 
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and lacking targetable assets, these groups struck at the Achilles’ heel of the Roman army.197  
Accordingly, the army’s counterinsurgency development would encounter imperatives to fix this 
failing.            
b. The army in the provinces 
 Although the Roman army was well equipped for high-intensity exchanges, these 
instances became increasingly rare during the long peace of the Principate.  Many thousands of 
legionnaires could spend their entire two-decade deployments without ever going to war.198  
Moreover, the army rarely functioned in isolation; garrisons interacted regularly with local 
populations, and many deployments (especially in the East) were directed more toward internal 
stability than external defense.199  According to Graham Webster, “The army was responsible for 
law and order in the provinces as well as their defense, and in effect acted as a police force.  
Such a force, in the modern sense, was unknown the ancient world and the protection of citizens 
and their property was a constant problem.”200  Rome – master of victory by arms – would have 
a difficult time adjusting to the demands of peace. 
 Rome’s first foray into policing began innocuously enough.  As the Roman army ranged 
deep into Iberia and Gaul, its traditional campaigning cycle (in which citizen-soldiers were 
released at the end of summer to tend their crops) became impractical.201  Permanent winter 
camps (hiberna) were established to ensure peace in occupied territory between military 
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expeditions.202  With the professionalization of Rome’s army and expansion of her dominion, 
police and paramilitary duties became an increasingly important legionary function.203  A letter 
written by a Roman soldier stationed in second-century AD Alexandria states that, “We are 
working hard because we are suppressing the uproar and anarchy in the city.”204  Other accounts 
tell of legionnaires pursuing criminal investigations or conducting house-to-house searches for 
weapons stashes.205  Talmudic sources attest to daily urban patrols and the use of secret police to 
root out criminals and conspirators.206  There is no reason to think that the public viewed these 
actions as universally oppressive; even in rebellion-minded Judaea, some residents appreciated 
the security of a nearby Roman garrison.207 
 Maintaining peace in the provinces required a reconceptualization of friend and enemy, 
and a reduction in the punitive measures so often favored by the Rome in times of war.  For a 
people schooled in bloodlust, this proved a monumental challenge.  In the judgment of Benjamin 
Isaac:  
The work of an army of occupation is basically different from that of a fighting army, but there is not 
usually a single, clear-cut process of reorganization which marks the transition.  The work of an occupying 
army is rarely morally edifying in terms of military glory or plain human decency.  It requires very special 
checks and balances for an occupation to be civilized in modern terms.  These did not exist in the Roman 
Empire.208 
While Isaac is correct in identifying the inapplicability of modern standards to ancient practice, 
this does not mean that Roman behavior did not moderate.  In fact, several episodes in the 
imperial period speak to laws explicitly formulated to protect local citizens from unruly 
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legionnaires.  During a visit by Germanicus to Egypt in AD 19, the general mandated that 
“neither boat nor beast of burden [be seized] nor quarters [occupied]” without his explicit 
consent.209  This sentiment was echoed by a prefect of Egypt in AD 42 who threatened severe 
penalty upon any soldier who made an unauthorized requisition of transport or travel.210  Much 
provincial hatred toward Rome was due to actions of corrupt bureaucrats, not imperial 
mandate.211  If the army failed to adjust to the role of occupier, it was not for lack of effort. 
 Instrumental to the army’s peacetime transformation were the Roman auxilia.  While 
archaeological evidence is limited, sources suggest that huge numbers of auxilia served as local 
peacemakers across the empire.212  Many of these units were adopted from local militias, and 
they often stayed close to their homelands.213  Both auxilia and legionnaires, deployed for many 
years at a time, formed family ties and sired children while on active duty.214  These veterans’ 
sons subsequently filled a larger and larger portion of the army’s ranks.215  By the beginning of 
Hadrian’s rule in AD 138, only Rome’s Praetorian Guard was still composed primarily of 
Italians.216  The versatile auxilia were relied on for more and more functions of government, and 
Hadrian inaugurated a new unit type – the numeri – who fought alongside legionnaires and 
auxilia while maintaining their original tribal leadership and customs.217  Meanwhile, the entire 
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army became less mobile as provincials found it possible to lead a fulfilling military career 
without ever leaving their home region.218  
c. The army transformed 
 Although it lies beyond the main purview of this study, it is useful to chart the endpoint 
of the army’s reorientation from conventional to asymmetrical threats.  Roman of the first 
century AD would hardly have recognized the army of the third.  The last known operation of an 
entire legion took place in the 240s AD; after that, the legion was a purely administrative 
grouping for a body of soldiers spread across hundreds of miles of territory.219  Deployments 
were localized, and the gulf between soldier and civilian grew steadily smaller as the two roles 
began to merge.220  Towns had grown up around military garrisons, of which these soldiers now 
also residents.221  As Luttwak observes, “Cities were becoming forts, and their inhabitants, 
involuntary soldiers on occasion; and forts were becoming towns inhabited by artisan-soldiers, 
merchant-soldiers, or farmer-soldiers.”222  The army had redirected its efforts toward combating 
low-intensity threats in the absence of high-intensity ones.223 
 Unfortunately, when the threat of organized, conventional armies emerged again in the 
early fourth century AD, Rome’s most powerful weapon of war – the legion – had depreciated 
tremendously.  While Roman arms had languished for lack of a strong enemy, Rome’s scattered 
enemies had gradually coalesced against the permanent presence of their own foe.224  Soldiering 
                                               
218
 Ibid, 74. 
219
 Roth 2009, 226. 
220
 Luttwak 1976, 171. 
221
 Ramsay MacMullen, Soldier and Civilian in the Later Roman Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1963), 122-124. 
222
 Luttwak 1976, 170. 
223
 Ibid, 171. 
224
 Heather 2010, 237. 
45 
 
was now a function of the frontier; hardly any of the domesticated peasants of Italy and Gaul 
even owned weapons.225  Rome’s consequent reliance on German federates (and resulting 
imperial decline) has already been discussed.  The point of reiterating the army’s failings here is 
to suggest that, just as the practices of the wartime army undermined its occupational role, so too 
did its embrace of paramilitary functions undermine its wider wartime capabilities.  At its most 
basic level, this series of events differs little from the one proposed by doomsayers of America’s 
expanded counterinsurgent capabilities.  An unassailable conventional army, evolving to combat 
increasingly low-intensity challenges, was surprised and defeated when a new high-intensity 
threat emerged.   
 
iii. Romanization 
 While Rome’s counterinsurgency practice can be sufficiently contextualized by her grand 
strategic aims and army development, these factors are not enough to explain why insurgencies 
occurred in the first place.  A revolt against Rome was not simply a repudiation of the empire’s 
grand-strategic goals or military actions.  It was also the function of a complex cultural 
interaction between Rome and the diverse peoples she governed.  In Mattern’s judgment, “One 
way to view insurgency, resistance, and banditry is as attenuated areas or holes in the network of 
social relationships that linked the empire together and bound it to the senatorial aristocracy and 
to the emperor.”226  Many of the most significant conflicts in Rome’s imperial history took place 
in provinces that had been pacified for decades, and which enjoyed regular interaction with 
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Roman nationals.227  Accordingly, these revolts can be partially understood as nativist backlashes 
against the permeation of an unfamiliar and alien society.  Roman control often outpaced Roman 
acculturation; this left “gaps” in the social fabric which found their expression through 
insurgency.228 
 The process of Roman acculturation is referred to broadly as “Romanization.”  This term 
encapsulates several distinct phenomena.229  Such inquiry must consider both Rome’s 
conceptualization of Romanizing cultures, and Romanizing cultures’ perception of Rome.  The 
former may be determined by examining Rome’s civilizing imperative and the methods by 
which this Romanization took place.  The latter may be learned through an assessment of the 
evolving beliefs and affiliation of provincial residents.  These two questions present the final 
challenge to conceptualizing the broader framework within which Roman counterinsurgency 
functioned. 
a. Rome and the world 
 This study has already described the economic realignment and military evolution which 
tied Rome closer to her provinces.  Just as instrumental was a fundamental shift in the way Rome 
perceived her relationship with foreign populations.  While Roman paranoia never disappeared, 
it was gradually supplemented by feelings of clemency and a desire to “civilize” the wider 
world.230  Vergil expressed this sentiment in his Aeneid, written between 29 and 19 BC: “Let it 
be your task, Roman, to control the nations with your power (these shall be your arts) and to 
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impose the ways of peace; to spare the vanquished and subdue the proud.”231  Similarly, 
Augustus boasted at the end of his life that, “When foreign races could safely be spared, I 
preferred to preserve rather than exterminate them,” suggesting his willingness to incorporate 
new peoples into the imperial framework.232  Roman conceptions of the word “barbarian” reflect 
this more conciliatory attitude.  Where the Greeks considered barbarians as alien peoples forever 
isolated by heritage as well as culture, Romans understood them only those who had yet to learn 
the ways of good society.233  Barbarians could become civilized, and civilized barbarians could 
become Romans. 
 Romanization was the means by which this transformation took shape.  Never a fully 
conscious or coordinated effort, Romanization functioned through a combination of 
socioeconomic, political, and cultural processes.  Its initial methods were economic: Roman 
merchants ranged far beyond the reaches of imperial power, selling Roman wares and 
encouraging local consumption.234  In much of Germany, for instance, tribesmen in the path of 
Roman caravans adopted Roman sensibilities without ever seeing a legate or legionnaire.235  
Merchants were followed by more formal indications of Roman control.  The construction of 
roads, intended to facilitate military movement and communication, accelerated Romanization as 
local populations were drawn tighter into the imperial network.236  Meanwhile, as more wealthy 
Roman citizens joined a community’s social fabric, they injected massive amounts of money into 
the provincial economies.237  These funds were often used in large-scale development projects 
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like the building of temples or fora, quintessentially Roman structures whose construction both 
glorified their commissioners and regularized distinctly Roman conventions.238  Such impressive 
public works increased the significance of cities, urbanizing previously rural populations and 
exposing them to further aspects of daily Roman life.239  This steady progression could stir alien 
peoples to be “living like Romans” within the space of a few generations.240      
  Rome’s mechanisms of political control also contributed to the widespread acculturation 
of the empire’s inhabitants.  Rome frequently oversaw her provinces through the manipulation of 
existing power structures.  Roman policymakers understood that dismantling traditional 
institutions would be costly and counterproductive; wherever possible, they exerted control by 
appealing to local elites.241  They were aided by the practice of hostage-taking, where the sons of 
aristocrats from across the empire were sent to Rome to receive their education.  Although these 
young nobles were hostages, the purpose of their relocation was not primarily coercive; they 
were not kept under guard, and often had the free run of the city.242  Instead, the Romans used 
this opportunity to instill Roman sympathies and values, and the provision of hostages became a 
means by which local kings could signal their good intentions.243  For example, Livy tells of a 
ruler who “sent his son to be educated at Rome, in order that he might even from childhood be 
acquainted with the manners and the persons of the Romans.”244  Augustus was appreciative 
enough of this process that he commanded hostages from the Aetolians to be cycled every three 
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years, in order to have the maximum effect.245  When these aristocrats eventually returned to 
their homelands, they carried the seeds of Romanization with them.               
 Most important in altering the dynamic between Rome and her provinces were 
underlying changes which blurred the boundary between indigenous and Roman custom.  In the 
late Republic, Cicero had preached – but failed to see realized – consensus among the various 
political orders and peoples of Rome.246  Under the Principate, such consensus came to fruition.  
For the first time in history, peoples across the Mediterranean world shared the same common 
deity.247  This was due to the rise of the imperial cult, and the willing worship of the Roman 
emperor from the colonies of North Africa to the sophisticated city-states of Greece to the wilds 
of Gaul.248  While the Augustan pantheon did not displace local gods, it effectively joined them, 
creating a powerful cultural tie which ran the length of the empire.249  Other developments like 
the adoption of a universal civic calendar also helped foster notions of a single, Romanized 
community.250  When foreign populations could claim ownership of the same traditions as 
Rome’s urban elite, Roman self-identification became a logical next step.    
 The broad process of Romanization ultimately affected a revolution in who constituted 
“Romans,” and a transformation in which the core regions of the empire overspilled the bounds 
of Italy.  Rome – long a hegemonic city-state willing to exploit its subsidiary provinces – now 
became a territorial empire with residents scattered across the Mediterranean world.251  Old 
orders were dissolved or recast in the spirit of pan-Romanism.  The changing nature of Gaul 
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offer a salient example; according to Woolf, “One striking contrast with the Republican system 
was the extent to which Roman power now involved individual Gauls as well as communities, 
just as recruitment of individuals had replaced the use of tribal retinues to assist Roman 
armies.”252  Also reflective of this change was the expansion of Roman citizenship, an honor 
long reserved for residents of Rome and a select few Italian allies, to new and distant peoples.  
During his reign from AD 41-53, the emperor Claudius championed the rights of Gauls to hold 
Roman office, arguing that it was a strong Roman tradition to accept foreigners into the state.253  
As the empire developed, the institution of citizenship developed with it.  Ultimately, 
Romanization drew disparate imperial populations closer toward the Roman ideal, challenging 
traditional distinctions between “us” and “them.”  
b. The world and Rome 
 Romanization would not present so significant a phenomenon if Roman culture had been 
embraced only half-heartedly or under duress.  Understanding how Rome viewed the world does 
not necessarily reveal how the world viewed Rome; those in power enjoy the privilege of 
imagining a unity between conqueror and conquered that is not always shared by the other party.  
In this case, however, evidence strongly suggests that Roman identity was adopted sincerely and 
proudly.254  Rome’s martial prowess may explain her acquisition of empire, but this factor alone 
does not rationalize her empire’s extreme longevity.  According to Clifford Ando, “The study of 
Roman interaction with provincials at the local level…suggests that the internal stability of the 
empire relied not on Roman power alone, but on a slowly realized consensus regarding Rome’s 
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right to maintain social order and to establish a normative political culture.”255  The Roman city 
and imperial Principate became a focus of patriotic loyalties across the Mediterranean.256  While 
this process took time, it also ensured Rome’s long-term survival. 
   Veneration of Roman identity and government became a defining characteristic of 
peoples who had been considered barbarians a few generations before.257  In Gaul, Woolf says, 
“Men literally came down from the hills, shaved off their beards, and learned to bathe 
themselves.”258  By the second century AD, Gallic commentators were condemning their old 
roots and offering praise for the Roman civilization which now constituted their own.259  
Throughout the empire, independent cities sought to reclassify themselves as Roman colonies, an 
act which would cede their freedom in return for closer affiliation with the Roman state.260  
Inhabitants placed increasing faith in the rationality and competence of Roman government, and 
many voiced the belief that they were fundamentally safer under Roman rule.261  The death of 
emperor Nero in AD 68 – an event which could have spelled the disintegration of the empire – 
instead affirmed Rome’s cohesion as provincials maintained loyalty to the office of emperor in 
the absence of an emperor himself.262  Livy’s pronouncement that “an empire remains powerful 
so long as its subjects rejoice in it,” long a Roman truism, became an accurate way to 
characterize the relationship between imperial residents and their Roman rulers.263 
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 Contrary to vilifications of Rome as a militaristic tyrant, an examination of Romanization 
reveals a far less sinister reality.  Yet just as significantly, this examination also suggests points 
of contention which might have added fuel to the fire of any anti-Roman movement or revolt.  
The increasing intrusion and economic clout of Roman merchants would have stirred hostility 
among those whose influence was threatened.  Meanwhile, the Roman “education” of young 
indigenous nobles would rightly have been considered indoctrination, and despised by some who 
suffered the process.  The intrusion of traditions like the imperial cult would certainly have 
caused anger among cultural conservatives intent of preserving their way of life.  Underlying it 
all would have been the well documented tensions between pro-Roman apostates, anti-Roman 
hardliners, and the large swath of individuals caught in the middle.264  It is toward a selection of 
such cases that this study now directs itself.                
 
III. CASE STUDIES 
i. Case Selection 
 This section presents an array of internal military challenges confronted by Rome 
between 216 BC and AD 72.  By isolating the relevant facts of each episode, it is intended to 
show that these events – taking place in wildly different contexts and locales – each constituted 
an insurgency with an appreciable counterinsurgent response.  Such an examination begins with 
Rome’s ham-fisted operations of the third and second centuries BC, suggesting that Republican 
generals had difficulty disentangling the requirements of counterinsurgency from the very 
different demands of high-intensity warfare.  This inquiry continues with the pivotal Italian 
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insurgencies of the first century BC, incidents which would have dramatically increased the 
salience of counterinsurgency to Roman policymakers.  Afterward comes a recounting of the 
major provincial revolts from 53 BC to AD 70, as well as the remarkable characteristics they 
share in common.  Next follows an examination of two insurgency situations which took place at 
the periphery of Roman power, and which were resolved through extra-violent or nonviolent 
measures.  Finally comes a description of the Jewish War of AD 66-72, the best-documented 
uprising in Roman history whose events suggest a complex insurgency gradually overcome by a 
competent counterinsurgent response.  In total, this chronology demonstrates both persistency of 
the insurgent threat and gradual refinement of Rome’s counterinsurgency practice. 
 Cases have been selected via the application of four criteria: date, available primary 
documentation, evidence of imperial inclusion, and evidence of population-centrism.  The 
rationale for AD 72 as an upper limit has already been discussed elsewhere in this study and will 
not be repeated here.  Meanwhile, the scarcity of primary documentation severely limits 
available scenarios.  Not only are ancient sources sparse, but their bias toward Roman supremacy 
inclines them to severely underreport instances of rebellion or revolt.265  The next criterion, 
imperial inclusion, requires that an event have taken place within the bounds of what might 
plausibly be considered Roman control.  This means that native resistance to invasion and first-
time occupation, like what occurred during the final consolidation of Iberia under Augustus, 
cannot properly be considered insurgency.266  The absorption of new territories and peoples into 
the empire took time, just as insurgencies take time to gestate.267  Last, an instance of insurgency 
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must demonstrate the presence and strategic use of neutral populations, not just reliance on 
irregular warfare.  For instance, while the Mithridatic Wars of 88-63 BC showed effective use of 
guerilla and terror tactics, they still constituted a conflict between two regular state actors.268   
 Alongside these four criteria rest other restrictions.  With 120 major recorded revolts 
between 27 BC and AD 190, it is not possible to adequately treat them all.269  For every case that 
can be selected, there are other, similar cases that cannot.  Moreover, of these instances that are 
expanded, available information differs wildly.  Roman naval development and attitudes toward 
piracy – arguably related to Rome’s struggles with land insurgency – is kept beyond the purview 
of this study.   Domestic sedition and conspiracy through the use of state institutions is similarly 
excluded.  Most significant is omission of the great civil wars of the first century BC and AD 
69’s “Year of the Four Emperors.”  Although some aspects of these historical episodes may 
resemble insurgency, battles for legitimate governmental succession remain fundamentally 
different entities.  After initial confusion, civil war quickly evolves into a quasi-international war 
between two or more parties; the same cannot be said for insurgency.270 
 The intent of these case studies is to complete the framework (begun in Part II) within 
which both the abstract principles and individual contexts of Roman counterinsurgency can be 
placed.  Although limited observations may be drawn through discussion of each example, 
broader analysis is reserved for Part IV.  As always, however, the three main premises of this 
study remain unchanged: that Rome faced recognizable insurgency, that Rome adopted distinct 
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counterinsurgency practice, and that this practice resembles many of the precepts still 
foundational to contemporary theory.            
 
ii. Insurgency in infancy 
 Rome was not always an imperial power, and her leaders did not always have to concern 
themselves with the regular administration and preservation of provinces.  As this transformation 
occurred, it brought new challenges which forced Rome to adapt in order to combat effectively.  
Rome’s first real encounter with counterinsurgency came during the midst of the Second Punic 
War starting in 216 BC, when a number of Roman socii (friendly but effectively subordinate 
Italian city-states) rose up and threatened to join Hannibal’s peninsular campaign.  The next 
instance came with Rome’s experiences preceding and during the Fourth Macedonian War of 
150-148 BC.  The final example inaugurated Rome’s long frustration policing the provinces of 
Iberia, embodied by the Lusitanian and Numantine Wars of 155-139 BC.  These three cases were 
foundational in reorienting Roman thinking toward counterinsurgency and away from regular 
war.     
               
 
 
a. Second Punic War 
56 
 
 Rome’s first flirtation with counterinsurgency occurred in the midst of the Second Punic 
War, when Hannibal’s forays into Italy and victory at the battle of Cannae made the 
Carthaginians “masters of nearly the whole of the Italian coast.”271  For the Romans’ part, they 
“despaired of retaining their supremacy over the Italians, and were in the greatest alarm, 
believing their own lives and the existence of their city in danger.”272  Early developments 
seemed to justify these fears.  The socii – cooperative but never satisfied with Roman 
predominance – began to defect to Hannibal’s army.  By 216 BC, Hannibal had won six pitched 
battles against the Roman army; his success offered a rallying point for those disenchanted with 
Roman rule.273  The willing surrender of Capua, an especially prosperous city-state, proved 
deeply traumatic for the Roman people.274 Loyalties across the peninsula were growing 
increasingly tenuous, and Rome was in danger of crumbling as much through internal betrayal as 
through external attack. 
   Several actions were taken to avert this potential catastrophe.  Prior to the defeat at 
Cannae, the Roman consul Fabius used his army to trail Hannibal’s, avoiding battle while 
launching guerilla-style raids and deterring would-be defectors.275  This strategy of attrition and 
intimidation (what would later be known as the “Fabian Strategy”), worked for a time, but 
proved deeply unpopular among Roman politicians who wanted quick and decisive results.276  
As years wore on and Rome again resorted to Fabian’s precedent, Hannibal’s army lost 
momentum and he proved incapable of directly attacking the heavily fortified city of Rome.  
Meanwhile, Rome besieged and captured Capua in 211 BC, killing its leading politicians and 
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enslaving its population, shipping them to every other nominally friendly city in Italy.277  The 
city itself, however, was spared.  As Livy reasons: 
Sternly and swiftly was punishment meted out to those who had been most guilty, the population was 
scattered far and wide with no hope of return, the unoffending walls and houses were spared from the 
ravages of fire and demolition.  The preservation of the city…afforded to the friendly communities a 
striking proof of her lenity; the whole of Campania and all the surrounding nationalities would have been 
horror-struck at the destruction of such a famous and wealthy city.  The enemy, on the other hand, was 
made to realize the power of Rome to punish those who were faithless to her.278        
Although Hannibal’s presence in Italy continued several more years and the Second Punic War 
itself another decade, Rome’s action at Capua spelt an end to the internal threat to the Roman 
state.  
 In some ways, this episode was not an insurgency, and it did not elicit a counterinsurgent 
response.  Major decisions were reached through pitched battles, not asymmetrical warfare.  
Hannibal’s incursion into Italy was a conventional operation; his recruitment of the socii was 
only an incidental step toward his military goals.  Yet the Carthaginian invasion also proved a 
catalyst for tensions that had, in the case of Capua, existed for many years.279  Accordingly, the 
rebellions of the socii represented a political statement against Roman authority, and a cause 
which enjoyed sympathy across Italy.  Rome’s consequent response was directed as much 
toward population persuasion as toward the defeat of Hannibal’s army.  Fabian’s strategy 
strongly discouraged defection, while the harsh reprisals at Capua and other city-states sent a 
powerful message to other members of Rome’s dominion.280  Any Italian leaders pondering 
rebellion against Rome need only have looked to nearby Capuan slaves in order to reconsider 
their actions.  Rome’s conduct in Italy suggests a counterinsurgency operation in the midst of a 
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much larger conflict.  Her success, while much delayed, ensured Italy’s loyalty for the next one-
hundred years.     
 
b. Fourth Macedonian War 
 The Fourth Macedonian War of 150-148 BC was a highly significant event in the course 
of Roman history.  After this conflict, Roman policymakers became convinced that peace could 
only be preserved through direct administration of Macedonian lands, charting the fateful 
beginnings of Roman imperialism.281  More significant to this study, the Fourth Macedonian War 
also represents a salient case of insurgency.  The war’s origins sprang directly from the harsh 
peace imposed on Macedonia at the end of the Third Macedonian War in 167 BC.  This 
settlement had seen Macedonia’s monarchy – once claimed by the likes of Philip II and 
Alexander the Great – effectively dissolved, and her former kingdom divided into four separate 
republics.282 In Livy’s judgment, this action was taken on account of, “[Fear] that if there were a 
common legislature for the nation, some relentless demagogue would turn the freedom given in 
healthy moderation into the license which brings ruin.”283  Some elites were forcibly relocated to 
Italy, and intermarriage and the trading of property between regions was prohibited.284  The 
cumulative result of these restrictions was extremely negative; according to Wolfgang 
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Rubinsahn, “Macedonia after 167 BC was basically poor, lacking investment capital and 
employment opportunities.”285    
Not all Macedonians were opposed to Roman rule.  A number of aristocrats, enjoying 
preferential treatment and lower taxes under the altered constitutional arrangement, were happy 
with this newfound peace.286  When violence erupted in 163 BC, therefore, it was likely as much 
between local Macedonian factions as between Macedonians and Romans.287  Although this 
unrest was quickly subdued, stirrings of revolt continued for the next decade.  The Macedonian 
revolutionary Andriscus, whose first attempts to stir up the people met with failure, found 
support among transplanted Macedonian nationals residing in Asia Minor.288  In 148 BC, 
Andriscus finally launched a successful coup, restyling himself as Philip VI (ancient sources 
more commonly refer to him as “Psuedo-Philip”) and using a combination of popular persuasion 
and irregular tactics to stir others to his side.289  Much of his national movement is unknown.  
Polybius reports frankly that, “A Philip [suddenly] appeared in Macedon as though he had 
dropped from the skies…it seemed an astonishing and inexplicable event; for there was nothing 
to give it the air of probability, or to supply a rational explanation of it.”290  After initial 
successes against both the Macedonian establishment and Rome, Pseudo-Philip launched 
domestic initiatives which Diodorus Siculus declares “a course of savage cruelty and tyrannical 
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disregard for law.”291  Psuedo-Philip was conclusively defeated in battle against Rome in 146 
BC, and the threat of Macedonian revolt was ended.292 
 Although records of Andronicus/Pseudo-Philip’s movement are extremely limited, 
several important observations can be made.  Whatever the general Macedonian population 
thought about Rome, they did not join Pseudo-Philip’s struggle en masse; not only did it take 
him years to build political momentum, but his harsh reprisals against domestic enemies suggest 
that disunion continued throughout the entire period.  Moreover, even pseudo-Philip’s actual 
resistance was strongly factional, comprised of various political and economic interests (as well 
as foreign mercenaries) whose only bond was a hatred for Rome.293  The Macedonian state post-
167 BC was effectively the result of foreign nation-building; since most of those foreigners had 
then left the state to its fate, this instability should not be surprising.  Unfortunately, very little is 
known of Rome’s response.  Livy writes only that, “[Pseudo-Philip] was defeated and captured 
by Quintus Caecilius, and Macedonia was subdued again.”294  However, the fact that “many 
Macedonians were sincerely happy” at Roman victory suggests that Roman interaction with the 
population had not been ineffective, as does Macedonia’s subsequent integration as a successful 
Roman province.295  The significance of the Fourth Macedonian War lies in its demonstration of 
insurgency, an insurgency which propelled Rome toward permanent occupation across Greece. 
 
 
                                               
291
 Diod. Sic. 32.9A. 
292
 Rubinsahn 1986, 146. 
293
 Ibid, 145. 
294
 Livy 50.14. 
295
 Rubinsahn 1986, 146. 
61 
 
c. Lustianian and Numantine Wars 
 Rome’s experiences in Iberia led directly to her first imperial responsibilities and her first 
prolonged encounters with asymmetrical warfare.  The Second Punic War gave cause for Rome’s 
initial incursion onto the peninsula as she was able to threaten Carthage’s Iberian possessions.  
There was widespread animosity for Carthage among the Iberian tribes, and many came over to 
Rome voluntarily during the war; it would not be a stretch to suggest that the Romans were 
greeted as liberators. 296  Yet this state of affairs did not last.  Following a series of conflicts 
during the first half of the second century BC, Iberia erupted in full-scale revolt following an 
invasion of Roman territory by the unaffiliated Lusitanians in 155 BC and an uprising by the 
nominally allied Celtiberians a year later.297  When the Lusitanians offered peace in 147 BC, 
their emissaries were slaughtered, and one survivor, Viriathus, reignited a bitter guerilla war.298  
Concurrently, the Celtiberians, centered on the town of Numantia, rallied fresh insurrection in 
the face of Roman brutality.299  The result was a series of extended campaigns waged by Rome 
against natives with alien practices and legitimate political grievances; these operations were 
extremely unpopular in Italy.300       
 This series of conflicts, known under the wide umbrellas of the “Lusitanian War” (155-
139 BC) and “Numantine War” (143-133 BC), cover many years with little available 
documentation.301  They are valuable, however, for the lessons they almost certainly internalized 
for future Roman military practice.  As one example, Appian tells of how clemency was wisely 
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showed to the remainder of Viriathus’ forces, as the Roman consul Caepio “took from them all 
their arms and gave them sufficient land, so that they should not be driven to robbery by 
want.”302  Such action (which led to long-term peace among the tribe) stands in marked contrast 
to savagery practiced by Rome during previous unsuccessful attempts to reach a settlement.  
Another important instance can be found in Scipio Aemilianus’ final besiegement of Numantia 
in 133 BC, after having extracted separate settlements from their former allies.303  His 
encirclement of the city was complete, fulfilling his intent that, “Nobody could have any dealings 
with them, nobody could come in, and they could have no knowledge of what was going on 
outside.”304  In a remarkable series of events, the Numantines nevertheless managed to dispatch a 
secret emissary to a nearby sympathetic city.  When Scipio heard of this, he dispatched a 
contingent of his fastest men, who cut off the hands of those who had been swayed by the 
Numantines’ plea.305  This action, communicating both intimidation and relative moderation 
(more traditional Roman generals might have killed them outright), ensured that Numantia 
received no outside aid.  Eventually the city capitulated and was razed, and Rome saw little 
trouble from Iberia for the next century.306           
 As is often the case in studying ancient history, only one source – the unspecific history 
of Appian – treats the Roman experience in Iberia with any depth.  While the rebellion of the 
Celtiberians and Numantians in particular bears some resemblance to insurgency, it is not 
possible to determine how long their resistance movement had persisted beyond looking to 
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earlier revolts of the period.307  More valuable is the information that remains of Roman 
response, and a general trend that demonstrated the ineffectiveness of universally harsh reprisal.  
Future episodes will demonstrate an increasing Roman willingness to offer concessions or 
enticements to insurgents.  Although it is not possible to prove that this reorientation occurred in 
the aftermath of Rome’s late second century BC Iberian campaigns, this seems likely.  Rome’s 
indiscriminate use of force in 147 BC had elicited fifteen more years of violence and many 
thousand more deaths; for any who suffered through the dangers and meager loot of those long 
campaigns, this would have remained a very salient lesson. 
 
iii. Insurgency at home 
 The first century BC brought two conflicts which drastically increased the relevancy of 
unusual military threats sprung from untraditional origins. The Social War of 91-88 BC was the 
final and most dangerous rebellion among the Italian city-states, and one which demanded 
political as well as military solutions.  Meanwhile, Third Servile War of 73-71 BC (made famous 
by the participation of Spartacus) confronted Rome with a domestic insurgency without an easy 
solution.  These two cases exerted an appreciable impact on how Rome viewed her insurgency 
challenge.   
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a. Social War 
 Although the Social War of 91-88 BC represented highly significant event in the course 
of Roman history, its accounts survive mainly in fragments.  The revolt, which spread rapidly 
among the assorted socii, began with the assassination of a Roman tribune advocating citizenship 
rights and senatorial representation for all Italians.  Roman conservatives had been alarmed by 
this plan, thinking it, “Not unlikely that [the Italians] would form a faction in the Senate by 
themselves and contend against the old senators more powerfully than ever.”308  Their violent 
deed was enough to convince the socii that a grant of citizenship was no longer possible nor 
desirable; with all other options exhausted, they decided to rebel.309  Secret plans were circulated 
among the various Italian allies, and hostages were exchanged in order to ensure that their 
intended act would take place.  When a Roman proconsul was informed of the ongoing 
conspiracy and confronted those in the city of Asculum, he was cut down, and all other Romans 
present were slain.310  As word spread, the Italians took up arms.  Their rebellion had begun.   
 The socii mustered an impressive field army which (notwithstanding the inflationary 
tendencies of ancient historians) numbered nearly 100,000.311  This was an extraordinary 
showing, and the resulting war led to a series of defeats and stalemates for the Romans.312  
Squeezed by the ongoing Mithradatic War in Asia Minor, Roman policymakers struggled to 
defuse the revolt before it toppled the state.313  Their answer was not a military solution, but a 
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political one.  Rome had suffered heavily from the rebellion of the socii, and continuing to sap 
the fighting potential of their countrymen made little strategic sense.  According to Appian: 
The Senate also voted that those Italians who had adhered to their alliance should be admitted to 
citizenship, which was the one thing they all desired most…By this favor the Senate made the faithful  
more faithful, confirmed the wavering, and mollified their enemies by the hope of similar treatment.314 
While diehards continued to hold out, their movement quickly lost momentum.  By the end of 89 
BC, nearly all Italians enjoyed the privileges of full Roman citizenship, and the remainder would 
gain it shortly thereafter.315  In one fell swoop, Rome had co-opted the rebels’ cause and driven a 
wedge between their various factions.       
 The question stands whether this rebellion constituted a civil war; disregarding the 
question of formal citizenship, it is clear that the socii were thoroughly Romanized populations 
who considered Romans their kinsmen.316  They fielded a powerful conventional army and 
established a formal capital, Italia, fulfilling two expectations of civil war.317  In other ways, 
however, the Social War better resembles the final stages of an insurgency.  Although Appian 
does not mention it, it is implausible that all the citizens of the socii spontaneously took up arms 
against Rome without extended debate and persuasion of undecided neutrals.  This effort would 
have been led by those individuals most strongly affiliated with anti-Roman movements, and 
parties who had been agitating against Rome well before the fateful assassination of 91 BC.  
Using denial of citizenship to galvanize a larger population, they saw rapid success – at least 
until the Senate robbed them of their call to arms.           
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b. Spartacus and the Third Servile War 
 One of the most famous insurgencies in the ancient world began at an undistinguished 
gladiatorial training school in Capua.318  In 73 BC, the Thracian gladiator and former auxilia 
Spartacus led seventy-four others in an escape from captivity.319  Not content merely to flee 
Italy, the small band sought a more general uprising against Roman rule; within a year, their 
original seventy-four had swelled to roughly 60,000.320  Although the last of three Servile Wars 
in this period, Spartacus’ movement – occurring in large numbers and amidst the heart of Italy – 
quickly became the most dangerous and scarring.  According to Barry Strauss, “The story of 
Spartacus is…a classic case study of an insurgency, led by a genius at guerilla tactics, and of a 
counterinsurgency, led by a conventional power that slowly and painfully learned how to beat 
the enemy at his own game.”321  Romans saw Spartacus’ rebellion far less charitably.  As the 
confrontation gradually escalated, they were always loathe to refer to it as a “war”; Caesar 
purposefully avoids using the term when reflecting on Spartacus’ tactics in his own writing.322  
Even Florus, writing nearly two centuries after the fact, calls the slaves “enemies” before 
interjecting, “I am ashamed to give them this title.”323  When Spartacus was finally defeated, the 
responsible general was curtly denied the honor of a triumph.324 
 Yet at their zenith, Spartacus and his followers posed a legitimate threat to Roman power.  
After their escape, the slaves had made their way quickly toward Mount Vesuvius, an excellent 
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strategic choice which granted them both the capability to ambush and to affect speedy 
withdrawals.325  Their ranks grew quickly from word of mouth, and from successful early 
victories against Capuan militiamen and eventually a proper consular army.326  Despite their lack 
of proper weaponry, the guerillas excelled at striking “soft” targets, terrorizing citizens and 
freeing rural slaves.327  Spartacus adopted the mantel of a mystical leader as well as a skilled 
general, receiving a widely-publicized prophecy that he would become a liberator with “great 
and fearful power.”328  With Spartacus’ movement presenting a tantalizing opportunity for Italy’s 
rural slaves, they began escaping en masse to join their hero.  Continual success, however, 
brought new challenges.  A growing slave faction pressured Spartacus to turn from irregular to 
regular tactics, and to begin challenging Rome in the field.329  Spartacus recognized the stupidity 
of this idea, and the inevitability of defeat if brought to battle.330  His goals remained the 
exhaustion of the Roman army, an eventual escape beyond Italy, and the courting of Rome’s 
enemies in order to build a potent coalition.331  Nevertheless, the bloodthirstiness of many of the 
guerillas made this plan impossible.  Spartacus was forced several times to permit other leaders 
to leave in order to attack the Roman forces directly, diminishing the strength of his movement 
in the process.332                 
 Rome’s response was initially feckless, as the small army dispatched to Vesuvius was 
summarily slaughtered.333  Two larger armies, each hastily raised and poorly led, were also 
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defeated by the irregular tactics of the insurgents.334  Spartacus’ use of local knowledge 
contributed to more victories, and yet – when the Alps and an escape from Italy finally laid open 
to him – he determined not to take it.335  Although his reasoning is unknown, it is after this point 
that Spartacus’ movement gradually came undone.  A new Roman general, Marcus Licinius 
Crassus, adopted an outlook based on his long experience with asymmetrical war in Iberia.336  
Strauss suggests that he modeled his strategy – location, isolation, and eradication – explicitly 
from Scipio Aemilianus’ treatment of Numantia more than fifty years earlier.337  Crassus’ 
attempts to strangle the insurgents’ supplies and block them from population centers proved 
wildly effective.  Yet Crassus’ actions proved unpopular among politicians accustomed to 
decisive engagements, and he was compelled to pursue more direct confrontation.338  Although 
Spartacus was able to escape several attempts in dramatic fashion, he could not run forever.  
After another insurgent faction separated and were defeated, Spartacus recognized the 
hopelessness of his situation, and died heroically in a one-sided battle against a large and well-
disciplined Roman army.339  While isolated bands of runaway slaves would terrorize Italy for 
another ten years, the core of the revolt had been broken.340 
 Ultimately, Spartacus’ insurgency had been a race against time.  His movement faced a 
limited pool of sympathizers from the offset; urban slaves were generally too satisfied with their 
current lot to risk rebellion, while (for obvious reasons) no other demographic would consider 
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joining a slave revolt.341  Moreover, Spartacus understood that the Roman hammer blow would 
fall at some point, and that he could not resist forever without expanding his base beyond Italy.  
In Strauss’ judgment, however, “Spartacus suffered the common fate of prudent revolutionaries 
everywhere: he lit a fire that he could not put out.”342  Rome, for her part, had eventually found a 
winning counterinsurgency strategy.  Roman action at the end of the Third Servile War 
demonstrates the length to which she wanted to avoid another such conflict as 6,000 rebels were 
crucified along the entire road from Capua to Rome.343  In addition to this powerful act of 
deterrence, Rome also turned to more active policing and gradually decreased the number of 
captives she took in battle.344  Most importantly, Rome made the prospect of manumission more 
attainable to her slave population, dramatically diminishing slave unrest.345  Spartacus’ revolt 
had made a powerful impression on the Roman consciousness, and its practices – drawn from 
past precedent – would be remembered in future counterinsurgent actions.         
 
iv. Insurgency abroad 
 With the formalization of Roman rule across much of her dominion in the late first 
century BC and first century AD, the character of Rome’s military challenges began to change 
rapidly.  Instead of facing initial resistance from alien populations, the Roman now faced 
concerted resistance from individuals who had spent their entire lives under Roman rule and 
custom.  The cases span a century and much of the Mediterranean: the revolt of Vercingetorix in 
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52 BC, the Dalmatian and Pannonian Revolts of AD 7, the revolt of Florus and Sacrovir in AD 
21, the revolt of Tacfarinas in AD 15-24, the revolt of Boudicca in AD 60/61, and the Batavian 
revolt of AD 69-70.  Excluding the revolt of Vercingetorix, documentary evidence is extremely 
sparse.  The point of their retelling is to identify characteristics common among them, and traits 
which will prove revealing in Part IV’s wider analysis.  
a. Revolt of Vercingetorix 
 The revolt of Vercingetorix in 52 BC was as much a conflict among Gauls as against 
Rome.  Thanks to the dual factors of military conquest and Romanization, Gaul of the first 
century BC was becoming increasingly Roman in character.  The cultural divide was growing 
rapidly between the urbanized “new” Gaul and the tribal Gaul of old.346  Vercingetorix was one 
such leader who, familiar with the ways of civilization offered by Rome, nevertheless agitated 
for Gallic independence.  His movement worried other elites who had benefited under Roman 
auspices, and he was banished for trying to incite rebellion.347  This turn of events did little to 
faze him.  As Caesar recounts: 
Still he persisted, and held a levy of down-and-outs and desperadoes in the open countryside instead.  After 
he had mustered this gang, every Arvernian whom Vercingetorix approached was won over to his own 
point of view.  He urged them to take up arms in order to win liberty for all.  Once he had assembled a 
large force, he exiled the opponents who so recently had themselves expelled him.348 
Vercingetorix quickly consolidated his position, receiving the title of king from his supporters.  
He dispatched embassies to tribes across Gaul, demanding soldiers and hostages.349  His efforts 
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produced an impressive conventional army, and his leadership succeeded in binding the disparate 
interests of the Gauls together.350          
 Caesar, the general who had spent his last five years pacifying Gaul, confronted severe 
challenges at the offset of the revolt.  If he permitted even one Gallic ally who remained loyal to 
be defeated by Vercingetorix, Roman protection would lose credibility, and tribes might flee to 
Vercingetorix en masse.351  Additionally, the rebels were able to use even small victories against 
unprepared Roman garrisons to huge propaganda effect, greatly bolstering the strength of their 
movement.352  Caesar’s solution was to range deep into rebels’ territory, showing relative 
clemency to those towns that surrendered quickly; his aim was to demonstrate insurgent 
weakness, not simply launch brutal reprisals.353  For his part, Vercingetorix resolved to adopt 
scorched-earth tactics, burning any Gallic settlement that might drain resources if it had to be 
defended.354  He bluntly declared that “there would no refuge for Gauls to avoid taking part in 
the campaign.”355  Yet Vercingetorix remained unable to defeat Caesar in the field, and he was 
hindered by the unrest of those under his command.356  Over a period of months, the rebels’ 
strongholds and bases of support were gradually neutralized, until they retreated to their final 
stronghold at Alesia.357  Despite a gallant defense, the Gauls could not overcome Roman 
siegecraft, and Vercingetorix surrendered in an attempt to spare his remaining followers.358         
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 Caesar’s commentaries on the Gallic War – our only record of Vercingetorix’s revolt – 
are unavoidably biased and limited.  Because Caesar was the commander of this operation, he 
does not enumerate on instances of Vercingetorix’s successes, although it is safe to assume that 
the Gallic leader achieved some victories in order to sustain his movement.  Similarly, only a few 
lines attest to Vercingetorix’s rise to power, and hardly any text discusses Caesar’s interaction 
with the neutral Gallic population.  These limitations notwithstanding, Vercingetorix’s revolt is 
significant for its repudiation of Romanization and expression of Gallic independence from a 
generation that had never experienced it firsthand.359  In Caesar’s assessment, “The whole of 
Gaul was united in the desire of restoring liberty…to such an extent that neither services 
rendered nor the remembrance of friendship moved them, and they concentrated all their efforts 
of will and resources on the war.”360  What began as a conflict between Gallic elites quickly 
transformed into a movement which embraced tribes across the region, reawakening old passions 
and driving toward a new notion of Gallic nationalism.361  However, confronted with the armies 
of Rome and ingenuity of Caesar, their rebellion could not last.  The tribes of Vercingetorix’s 
coalition were slowly peeled away, while unaffiliated Gauls were persuaded by force of Roman 
arms.  Vercingetorix’s forces were isolated and eradicated, and his movement crumbled.  
Vercingetorix’s cause, while strong, had not been matched by a similarly strong army. 
 
 
 
                                               
359
 Dryson 1971, 245. 
360
 Caes. B Gall. 7.76. 
361
 Dryson 1971, 245. 
73 
 
b. Dalmatian and Pannonian Revolts 
 Taking place in AD 7, the concurrent revolts of the Dalmatians and Pannonians in the 
ancient region of Illyria (roughly the modern day Balkans) would grow to have a powerful effect 
on the future course of Roman imperialism.362  At the time of the rebellion, much of the territory 
had undergone Romanization for the last century, and Roman control was becoming increasingly 
solidified.363  It was one measure of formalized Roman rule, the introduction of regular tribute, 
which drove these populations beyond the brink.364  A native leader of the Dalmatians, Bato, 
excited these tensions toward revolt, while another Bato did the same for the Pannonians.  Very 
little is known of these men except that they were both likely Romanized and well acquainted 
with the Roman army.365  Cassius Dio tells us that an early success of Bato the Dalmatian caused 
the rebellion to grow exponentially as it was shown that the Romans could be beaten.366  Another 
Roman army was defeated by ambuscade, and when the future emperor Tiberius marched against 
the Dalmatian rebels: 
Although Tiberius approached them, they would engage in no pitched battle with him, but kept moving 
from one place to another, causing great devastation; for, owing to their knowledge of the country and the 
lightness of their equipment, they could easily proceed wherever they pleased.  And when winter set in (and 
the Roman army went to quarters) they did much greater damage.367           
Initial Roman offenses were frustrated by the Dalmatians’ and Pannonians’ use of asymmetrical 
warfare.  The guerillas also made masterful use of mountain fortresses, launching sporadic raids 
and acts of terror before retreating to safety.368 
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 Despite a troop concentration that rivaled that of the civil wars, Rome proved unable to 
neutralize the insurgency by force alone.369  Instead, Roman success came when generals took 
advantage of the infighting that had grown amongst the rebels’ coalition.  As tribes turned on 
each other to resolve personal power struggles, Rome conquered a few and “won over some of 
the others without a battle.”370  The campaign against the remaining hardliners became a brutal 
march from one town to the next.  Romans arms reduced each stronghold in turn, driving the 
insurgents further and further from the general population.371  Eventually, the Dalmatian Bato 
was captured.  Asked why he had revolted for so long and so fiercely, he replied, “You Romans 
are to blame for this; for you send as guardians of your flock, not dogs or shepherds, but 
wolves.”372  Disregarding the issue of corruption on the part of individual administrators (almost 
a given in the ancient world), Bato’s answer reflects the hostility that would have been accorded 
any Roman tax-collection effort.  Coupled with a nativist backlash against the broadening 
incursion of Roman culture, the cause of the Dalmatian and Pannonian uprisings seems 
apparent.373  The rebels’ skilled use of terrain and guerilla tactics allowed them to avoid the rapid 
military defeat of Vercingetorix before them; when the insurgents finally succumbed, it was due 
as much to Roman diplomacy as Roman arms.374               
c. Revolts of Florus and Sacrovir 
 Accounts of the revolt of Julius Florus and Julius Sacrovir in AD 21 Gaul are scarce even 
by the standards of ancient history.  Its significance lies in the fact that it took place in a 
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thoroughly Romanized region, seventy-two years after the similar rebellion of Vercingetorix.  
Florus and Sacrovir Gallic elites and honorary Roman citizens who ruled with Rome’s blessing 
and support; their defection came as a tremendous shock.375  According to Tacitus, while the 
principle stimulus was economic hardship, the revolt’s deeper underpinnings were ideological.376  
In small gatherings, Florus and Sacrovir spoke of “a grand opportunity for the recovery of 
freedom,” and appealed to the vitality of Gallic national character in contrast to the corruption of 
Rome.377  The insurgents were debtors and rural poor, and they committed early acts of brutality 
against Roman civilians in order to affirm commitment to their cause.378  In response, Roman 
legions took brutal measures to ensure the loyalty of individual Gallic towns.379  Meanwhile, 
Tiberius, now emperor, adopted a demeanor of studious unconcern.380  His attitude was reflective 
of the previously identified Roman inclination to marginalize insurgency and irregular threats.  
In private, he likely followed the rebellion with grave concern.   
Inexplicably, the rebels resolved to offer battle.  Tacitus describes a flowery speech in 
which Sacrovir recalled, “The ancient glories of the Gauls…[of] how grand would be the 
freedom of the victorious, [and] how more intolerable than ever the slavery of a second 
conquest.”381  Tacitus also describes how Sacrovir’s army was shortly annihilated, and how the 
entire movement collapsed shortly thereafter.382  In short order, Gaul once again became a 
peaceful and productive Roman province; there is little indication of widespread reprisal in the 
aftermath of the revolt.  Significantly, however, Florus and Sacrovir’s failed movement led to 
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wider changes in the relationship between Roman administrators and local Gallic elites.  The 
Druids – Gaul’s ancient and influential religious order who had constituted a central part of 
Gallic life for centuries – were curtailed and largely eliminated.383  Rome therefore neutralized 
the last bastion of Gallic power not associated with Roman rule.384  In future, any leader seeking 
authority would have to utilize explicitly Roman institutions, greatly diminishing the potential 
use of anti-Roman sentiment.  Consequently, while minor unrest would continue, nativist revolts 
effectively ceased after this period.                        
d. Revolt of Tacfarinas 
 The revolt of the Numidian Tacfarinas from AD 15-24 offers a salient case of a long-
lasting insurgency defeated by means of sophisticated military practice.  Like previous 
rebellions, Tacfarinas’ began largely as a struggle against Romanized elites who ruled under 
Rome’s auspices.  Insofar as the roots of his movement are known, Tacifarinas formed his 
coalition through a mix of persuasion and violent coercion.385  He was uniquely qualified for this 
effort; a former auxilia who had served in his homeland, he combined familiarity with Roman 
tactics with a deep knowledge of Numidian territory.386  Moreover, many Numidians shared a 
concern over both the endangerment of tribal lands via Roman colonization and loss of tribal 
custom via Romanization.387  The result was widespread support for Tacfarinas’ cause.  
According to Tacitus, “[Tacfarinas] gathered round him a roving band familiar with robbery, for 
plunder and for rapine.  After a while, he marshaled them like regular soldiers under standards 
and in troops, till at last he was regarded as the leader, not of an undisciplined rabble, but of [an 
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entire] people.”388  He raided deep into Roman territory, terrorizing Roman sympathizers and 
drawing more support to his cause.389  Roman observers must have been reminded of their 
previous struggle with the Numidian king Jugurtha, whose famous Jugurthine War against Rome 
in 112-105 BC had seen brutally effective use of guerilla tactics against ill-prepared 
legionnaires.390 
 Yet when Tacfarinas encountered a proper Roman army in AD 17, he attempted to defeat 
them in a conventional encounter.  The result was an unmitigated disaster.  Numidians fled 
wildly from the field, and the responsible Roman general was accorded triumphal honors for his 
apparent victory.391  Contrary to expectations, however, Tacfarinas’ resistance was far from 
broken.  For the next seven years, he pursued a successful pattern of asymmetrical warfare, 
plundering villages and destroying isolated Roman units.392  His demands for land proved a 
source of anxiety for Tiberius, who could not tolerate the notion of, “a deserter and brigand 
assuming the character of a belligerent.”393  Because Tacfarinas was able to retire to the vast 
wilds of Numidia’s interior – inhabited by nomads friendly to his cause – he was not lacking for 
a base of support.  Meanwhile, his tactics were persistently frustrating.  As Tactius recounts, 
“Unequal to us in solid military strength, but better in a war of surprises, he would attack, would 
elude pursuit, and still arrange ambuscades with a multitude of detachments.”394  It was easy to 
identify the problem; it much more difficult to find an adequate solution. 
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 This changed with the ascension of Junius Blaesus, a well regarded Roman commander, 
to the proconsulship of Africa and ongoing campaign against Tacfarinas.395  Blausus’ innovative 
actions demonstrated an awareness of good counterinsurgency practice.396  He began with an 
offer of amnesty to any rebels who would lay down arms; a highly effective strategy whose use 
was unusual in the ancient world.397  From there, Blaesus divided the Numidian outlands into 
three military zones, dispatching adequate troops to secure each.398  These detachments were 
broken into smaller formations, led by experienced centurions with a working knowledge of the 
area.399  Instead of retiring to winter quarters and removing themselves from the population, the 
army utilized systems of forts to box in the guerillas, engaging them wherever possible.400  
Consequently, population centers ceased to be used by Tacfarinas’ forces, and “whichever way 
[an insurgent] turned, a body of Roman soldiers was in his face, or on his flank, or frequently in 
the rear.”401  Columns of mobile infantry “drove Tacfarinas…from one set of huts to another,” 
gradually disconnecting him from his remaining refuges.402  His death in AD 24 brought the final 
disintegration of his coalition and the end of his movement.403 
 After Tacfarinas’ long and costly resistance, Rome had no intention of permitting another 
leader to take his place.  Numidian tribes were assigned to specified reservations, often far from 
their ancestral lands.404  Moreover, conscious efforts were made to absorb tribal leaders into 
Roman society with the provision of land, political power, and – eventually – Roman 
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citizenship.405  With a blending of local and Roman rule, future rebellion became extremely 
unlikely.406  More generally, Rome’s behavior during Tacfarinas’ revolt reflected an important 
military evolution.  An insurgency grounded in guerilla tactics and the clever use of the sparsely 
guarded frontier had been neutralized through the use of mobility, isolation, local knowledge, 
and population protection.  It is for good reason that Roth, in discussing Blaesus’ practices, 
explicitly uses the term “counterinsurgency.”407  Blaesus’ success, lauded by his contemporaries, 
must have exerted a powerful effect on how Rome viewed future insurgency challenges.408    
 
 
e. Revolt of Boudicca 
 A brief examination of the rebellion of Queen Boudicca in AD 60/61 Britain (the date is 
unclear) reveals themes common to other revolts of the period.  This movement, centered on the 
British Iceni, began twenty years after Roman integration of the tribe and well over a century 
after Rome’s first contact with the region.409  Tacitus attributes the cause of the rebellion to a 
series of Roman atrocities like the senseless slaughter and mass enslavement of the previously 
peaceful Iceni.410  Boudicca herself, Queen of the Iceni, was reportedly violated alongside her 
two daughters, and their royal house dissolved.411  It has been argued that these acts seem 
uncharacteristic of Roman governance, and that Boudicca herself may be a literary device to 
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reflect wider discontent with Roman rule.412  Regardless, ongoing Romanization (like the 
erection of an imperial cult temple) and ineffectual administration were enough to stir passions 
among the Iceni and other tribes.413  While the Roman governor Suetonius Paullinus was 
campaigning against a Druidic stronghold near Wales, the British rose up and massacred the 
Roman civilian population; the severity of their actions was intended to tighten their coalition by 
making defection to the Romans impossible.414  Roman garrisons were defeated piecemeal, 
eliciting easy victories which caused more tribes to flock to Boudicca’s cause.415  All the while, 
the revolt permeated with nativist and religious sentiment, replete with prophecy and “ravings in 
a strange tongue.”416 
 The Romans were caught flat-footed.  This is demonstrated best by the modesty of the 
garrisons that had been left in the region; the Iceni were considered mostly pacified.417  In an 
unexplained line of reasoning, the British rebels (now numbering a supposed 230,000) took to 
the field against Suetonius’ rapidly returning army.418  As the smaller Roman force formed for 
battle, Suetonius dismissed the British rabble as “unwarlike, unarmed, [who] will give way the 
moment they have recognized that sword and that courage of their conquerors.”419  Suetonius’ 
assessment was proven correct, and although accounts of the battle vary, it was almost certainly 
a one-sided Roman victory.420  Boudicca either committed suicide or succumbed to sickness (or 
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did not exist), and the body of the revolt died with her.421  As Guy De La Bedoyere critically 
reflects, “Had [Boudicca] sustained a guerilla campaign she could have made life unremitting 
misery for the Romans by tying down huge numbers of soldiers and constantly disrupting…any 
attempt to Romanize Britain.”422  The rebels’ rapid drive toward a decisive encounter was likely 
the product of overeager factions within the coalition, while the initial uprising was almost 
certainly the result of a more protracted insurgency which happened upon the right actions at the 
right time.  After the disintegration of Boudicca’s movement, no record exists of further regional 
disturbances.423  Whatever Rome’s subsequent actions, they proved effective. 
f. Batavian Revolt 
 The last of this section’s selected revolts is that of the Batavi, a German tribe on the 
lower Rhine, in AD 69-70.  Its principle leader was a Batavian auxiliary commander named 
Julius Civilis, an individual well acquainted with not only Roman tactics and culture, but also the 
minutia of Roman politics.424  Despite Civilis’ demonstrated Romanization, he vested his 
movement in as many nativist trappings as possible.  His initially small circle met at a Batavian 
sacred grove, and he made his followers swear oaths in both the Roman and Batavian manner.425  
As his movement became stronger and more vocal, he began to dye his hair red, letting it grow 
out in the ancient tradition of Batavian warriors.426  His aim was fundamentally one of 
independence; he spoke derisively of the Batavians’ treatment as slaves at the hands of the 
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Romans, and of the weakness which infested Rome’s imperial government.427  Launching their 
revolt during Rome’s chaotic civil war of AD 69, the Batavians saw strong initial success.  
Victories against scattered garrisons afforded the rebels both resources and prestige, allowing 
them to field more conventional forces and win larger encounters.428  Tacitus describes Civilis’ 
use of captured Roman standards as potent tools for morale and increased recruitment.429  
Meanwhile, Civilis strengthen his personal power by using a well-regarded prophetess to veil 
him in mysticism and increase his prestige.430 
 Ultimately, Civilis made strong gains so long as Rome was distracted and at war with 
itself.431  His fortunes changed quickly once the issue of imperial succession had been resolved.  
Although his awareness of the new danger was reflected by his desperate attempts to entice Gaul 
and Germany into more general revolt, his efforts saw limited gain.432  The rebellious tribes were 
unable to mount a united front, and individual leaders were forced to take drastic action (like the 
publicized murder of Roman legates) in order to prevent widespread defection to Rome and her 
allies.433  This was also ineffective.  The Roman general Petilius Cerialis showed skillful 
proficiency in dismembering Civilis’ revolt through diplomacy as much as military strength.434  
Tactius describes Cerialis’ promises to turncoat auxilia that, “Their past crimes would be 
remembered neither by the emperor nor by himself,” and how many eagerly took advantage of 
Roman clemency.435  As Rome defeated the armies of Civilis in the field, more tribes flocked to 
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the Roman standard, betraying their leaders in order to spare themselves.436  In a particularly 
intriguing episode, Cerialis even tried to bribe Civilis’ famous prophetess, again demonstrating 
his skill in driving wedges between the remaining insurgents.437  While Tacitus’ account breaks 
off abruptly, it can be presumed that the Batavian revolt had a largely diplomatic resolution.438  
Roman arms had been combined with additional means of population persuasion, leading to a 
successful neutralization of the rebellion by the end of AD 70.   
 
v. Insurgency triumphant 
 Rome was not always successful in instances of insurgency and revolt.  Sometimes, even 
the most masterful combination of force and persuasion was unable to sufficiently pacify a 
region, necessitating less common courses of action.  Two examples attest to this phenomenon.  
The first instance is the famous revolt of the German Arminius in AD 9, an event which 
fundamentally altered Roman conceptions of empire and led to the effective cession of all 
territory beyond the Rhine.  The second instance is the complex relationship that Rome pursued 
with the various hill tribes and nomadic groups that ranged within its territory, a relationship 
which saw Rome – the unquestionably stronger power – paying annual tribute in order to deter 
attack.  Together, these episodes attest to the “extra-violent” methods by which Rome 
occasionally defused insurgency.       
a. Revolt of Arminius and Battle of Teutoburg Forest 
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 For centuries, no event elicited more national anger and embarrassment among Romans 
than the AD 9 revolt of the German Arminius and his treachery at the Battle of Teutoburg Forest.  
That incident, which claimed three Roman legions and as many as 30,000 lives, dramatically 
affected the course of Roman imperialism.  Its impact is hard to overstate; as Murphy puts it, 
“Imagine a combination of 9/11, Pearl Harbor, and Little Bighorn.”439  For the purposes of this 
study, a more accurate comparison may be the American experience in the Vietnam War and the 
psychologically traumatic Tet Offensive.  After AD 9, Roman policymakers essentially “gave 
up” on the formal incorporation of German territory beyond the Rhine.440  While the economic 
and cultural mechanisms of Romanization continued, there were no more concerted attempts at 
invasion beyond the campaigns of reprisal ending in AD 16.441  Consequently, the Rhine became 
an increasingly formalized Roman border, and a cultural boundary which remains apparent to 
this day.442  
 Arminius’ rebellion began in much the same manner as the six provincial revolts 
examined in the previous section.  Paterculus describes Arminius as a “young man of noble birth, 
brave in action and alert in mind, possessing an intelligence quite beyond the ordinary 
barbarian.”443  Coupled with his high Roman rank and proven service in the army, he was clearly 
a Romanized German well regarded by local Roman leadership.444  Despite this, Arminius’ tribe 
had a history of revolt, and the entire region was roiling under accelerating Romanization and the 
first imposition of formal imperial taxation.445  Religious fervor was particularly strong; as Peter 
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Wells observes, “What is often ignored is the strong element of jihad in Arminius’ crusade.”446  
Additionally, nativist yearning for “their old life of independence” inevitably contributed to 
overall German unrest, creating ready adherents for Arminius’ cause.447  Just like other rebel 
leaders before him, Arminius’ initial concerns would almost certainly have been internal: he had 
overcome a series of pro-Roman German aristocrats and win tribal authority through a mix of 
charisma and military strength.448  By all accounts, this would have been a slow and highly 
secretive process.449  All the while, Arminius took pains to maintain his good relationship with 
Roman administrators. 
 Rome had little reason to suspect German resentment or treachery.  Most Roman 
observers considered the region pacified after the campaigns of Tiberius in AD 4.450  
Accordingly, Publius Quinctilius Varus, governor of Germany at the time of the revolt, was 
principally concerned with provincial development and local policing.451  Although ancient 
sources treat Varus with scorn – Paterculus bitterly describes him as “somewhat slow in mind as 
he was in body” – these accounts are almost certainly tinged with revisionism and directed 
toward scapegoating.452  On the contrary, Varus was a competent governor with an extensive 
intelligence network who had gained counterinsurgency experience quelling a revolt in Judaea 
thirteen years earlier.453  Told of Arminius’ impending betrayal by a German defector, Varus 
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dismissed the warning as a rivalry between warring chiefs.454  When a small disturbance 
(contrived by the Germans) compelled Varus to gather his forces and investigate, he took 
Arminius among his escort.455  As the Roman column, strung out and weary, advanced through 
the treacherous terrain of Teutoburg Forest, Arminius sprang his elaborate ambuscade.  Surprise, 
fatigue, and poor conditions neutralized the tactical advantages of the Roman army.456  In a 
chaotic series of encounters which ranged over three days, German tribesmen won skirmish after 
skirmish, eventually annihilating the Roman column and stealing their precious standards.457  
The successful Germans sacked every Roman settlement east of the Rhine, declared victory, and 
promptly dissolved into disunity as the expected Roman response did not materialize.458 
 In Rome, the consequences of Teutoburg Forest caused a delay of several years before 
serious action could be taken.  The loss of three legions was a devastating drain on Roman 
manpower and material; even worse, such a catastrophic defeat had the potential to destabilize 
the empire and embolden her other enemies.459  Yet, as identified earlier in this study, Roman 
retaliation remained one of the great certainties of the ancient world.  The hammer blow finally 
fell in AD 14, when Roman legions ranged deep into German territories on a punitive campaign 
which was intended more to demonstrate Roman might than regain lost land.460  Further 
campaigns saw a splintering of Arminius’ coalition as Germans defected en masse to Rome, and 
a battlefield defeat of Arminius which ended his threat to Roman power.461  Rome’s 
predominance was restored.  In the words of Cassius Dio, “[Rome] advanced as far as the ocean, 
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inflicted an overwhelming defeat upon the barbarians, collected and buried the bones of those 
who had fallen with Varus, and won back the military standards.”462  Despite this success, Rome 
made no attempt to formally integrate German lands, and launched no more offensives once 
Arminius’ coalition had been reduced.463  Territory beyond the Rhine continued to be frequented 
by Roman merchants, but it was no longer traveled by Roman legionnaires.   
 Arminius’ revolt is unique in that, contrary to nearly all other ancient insurgencies, it 
succeeded.  For a period of years, Germans enjoyed the retreat of Roman power from their daily 
lives.  Even after Rome reasserted herself – wreaking indiscriminate damage and slaughter – the 
relationship between Rome and the tribes of Germany had undergone a fundamental change.  
Where previously Rome had exercised her power through direct rule, after AD 9 she was content 
to court the Germans from a distance.  Tacitus reflected this newfound sentiment when he 
declared, “May the tribes, I pray, ever retain if not love for us, at least hatred for each other; for 
while the destinies of empire hurry us on, fortune can give no greater boon than discord among 
our foes.”464  Roman interventionism was replaced by a more cautious program of gifts, 
subsidies, and studied manipulation of the warring German tribes.465  While this shift toward soft 
power was enough to pacify the Rhineland for several hundred years, it lies well outside the 
boundaries of what constituted standard Roman operating procedure. 
b. Mauretanians, Ituraeans, and Isaurians 
 Just as Rome handled the German revolt of AD 9 by effectively conceding her borders, 
so she found a similar way to resolve the longtime frustration posed by the empire’s semi-
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autonomous hill tribes and nomads.  These groups peppered the most rugged regions of the 
empire: they included the Mauretanians of Morocco, the Ituraeans of Lebanon, and the Isaurians 
of southwestern Anatolia.  Strabo best describes the aggravation posed by these tribes in his 
description of the geography of Lebanon: 
Now all the mountainous parts are held by Ituraeans and Arabians, all of whom are robbers, but the people 
in the plains are farmers; and when the latter are harassed by the robbers at different times they require 
different kinds of help.  These robbers use strongholds as bases of operation…high up on the mountain, 
Sinna and Borama and other fortresses like them, and down below, Botrys and Gigartus and the caves by 
the sea.466 
Although many of these groups lived within nominally Roman territory, their isolation and 
stubborn cultural practice shielded them from most of the effects of Romanization.467  Because 
their own land was so unproductive, they subsisted on banditry and raids into lowland 
communities.468  They also fought stubbornly against Roman incorporation, necessitating a 
suitable Roman response.  According to Isaac, “Mountainous territory inhabited by 
accomplished guerilla fighters determined to resist a foreign power, can be permanently 
occupied only by an army which is constantly prepared to interfere, regularly patrols the 
countryside, visits every village, and protects its own communications.”469  Because Rome was 
unwilling to levy these substantial resources to secure such poor and unproductive territory, 
another solution was required. 
       Very often, this took the form of de facto independence and regular tribute for these 
“trouble regions.”  In Mauretania, for instance, it was common practice for each Roman 
governor to negotiate a new subsidy and peace treaty with the unruly hill tribes.470  Elsewhere, 
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the Isaurians effectively grew to constitute their own quasi-state under the auspices of Roman 
authority, enjoying free reign in the conduct of their own affairs.471  Very often, this strategy 
neutralized the threat posed by these unintegrated peoples.  The Isauarians – fierce warriors who 
clung to their autonomy throughout all of antiquity – nevertheless proved peaceful toward their 
Roman neighbors.472  After AD 51 and the formalization of Roman tribute, no source attests to 
unrest in the region until the third century.473  These groups, both violent and vehemently 
nativist, ultimately managed to reach a fairly tranquil coexistence with Roman power.474  While 
an usual and remarkably conciliatory way for Rome to defuse potential insurgency, this effort 
was undoubtedly effective.                
      
vi. Insurgency realized 
 The last selected episode of revolt is the famous Jewish War of AD 66-72, an insurgency 
which boasts detailed record among both ancient histories and Talmudic texts.475  This rebellion 
demonstrated both a complex, multi-factional resistance effort and a population-centric Roman 
response focused on driving wedges between various insurgent groups.  Its events, concisely 
recounted here, should resolve remaining doubts about Rome’s insurgency challenge and 
counterinsurgent response. 
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a. Jewish War 
 The province of Judaea offers an unusual case in the means and method by which it was 
brought into Rome’s political orbit.  Serious Roman interaction with the region began in 40 BC, 
when Rome named the Romanized aristocrat Herod as King of Judaea.476  Over his thirty-six 
year reign, Herod was able to consolidate his kingdom and accelerate the processes of 
Hellenization and Romanization which were necessary to maintain friendly relations with the 
Romans.477  However, these efforts proved highly unpopular with Judaea’s vast Jewish 
population, who – in contrast to indigenous peoples elsewhere in the empire – already possessed 
a sophisticated and well-entrenched cultural tradition.  With Herod’s death in 4 BC, Judaea 
descended into war between pro-Roman and anti-Roman camps, exacerbated by tensions 
between native Greeks and Jews.478  This conflict culminated with the Jewish independence 
movement of Judas of Galilee in AD 6.  According to Susan Sorek, although this effort was 
defeated and Judaea made a formal province, “The doctrines and notions bred out of this 
rebellion engendered the idea that terrorism and open revolt would inevitably be the only 
solution against Roman domination.”479  Because the Jews boasted a well developed national 
character and religion, they were much more prone to resist the “civilizing” methods of the 
Romans.  Accordingly, even while a new Romanized Jewish aristocracy was given power over 
the region, nativist tensions simmered just below the surface.480          
 Although Judaea was never entirely peaceful (sources attest to sporadic political violence 
throughout its history), the newly incorporated province saw little major disturbance for 
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decades.481  When unrest finally spread in AD 65, it was due to a series of missteps and 
miscommunications which inflamed the Jewish community.  This included acts of perceived 
Roman impropriety, the ham-fisted conduct of Roman administrators in resolving a Jewish-
Greek dispute, and the callous actions of a few Roman soldiers in breaking up a resultant Jewish 
protest.482  These actions, while incompetent, were amplified by the rhetoric of a variety of 
Jewish groups intent on fostering rebellion against Rome.  There were as many as five major 
factions, each with their own distinct agendas.483  Some were revolutionaries who wanted to 
found a new, non-elite government oriented toward land redistribution.484  Others were 
aristocrats intent on remaining in power by taking advantage of the anti-Roman slant of popular 
opinion.485  The most extreme elements were represented by groups like the Sicarii (described at 
the beginning of this study), terrorists who had been instrumental in facilitating an atmosphere of 
rebellion, but who played a much less significant role in the bloody revolt itself.486  What should 
be clear from this brief survey is the complexity of Judaea’s anti-Roman movement, and the 
extent to which it emerged from intra-Jewish tensions and rivalries.  It took the emergence of a 
broad, ideological catalyst – perceived Roman sacrilege and brutality – to bind these disparate 
groups together. 
   The first insurgent actions were targeted more toward pro-Roman Jewish sympathizers 
than toward actual Roman occupiers.  In Jerusalem, the client king Agrippa was besieged in his 
palace, while targeted acts like the burning of debtors’ records rallied more and more Jews to the 
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rebels’ cause.487  Despite Agrippa’s dark tidings to his people that, “When the Romans have 
won…they will make an example of you to other nations by burning down your holy city and 
destroying your entire race,” the revolt continued to grow, and its atrocities continued to 
mount.488  On one occasion, a Roman garrison was permitted to surrender and then massacred, 
and on another, Roman emissaries were slaughtered before a wider audience could hear their 
offer of amnesty.489  These incidents were intended to draw moderates into the rebels’ camp; if 
they believed they would suffer at the hands of the consequent Roman reprisal, they no longer 
had any inhibition against taking up the insurgents’ cause.490  Early successes emboldened the 
revolt, causing more and more towns to drive out their Roman garrisons.491  As the insurgents’ 
forces grew, they began to field a regular army, this action intended as much to mitigate the 
power of individual Jewish leaders as to pose a conventional threat to Rome.492  The center of the 
movement became Jerusalem; its religious and cultural significance gave the rebellion much-
needed credibility.493  Coins were minted and (however briefly) an independent state was 
declared.494  
 Rome’s response was initially sluggish but ultimately effective.  An initial army had no 
problem subduing scattered Judaean settlements and reasserting Roman rule through a mix of 
clemency and reprisal, but it foundered against the imposing walls of Jerusalem.495  The first 
attempt to shatter the insurgents’ fragile coalition underestimated the Jews’ much stronger hatred 
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of Rome, and Roman forces fled under the harassment of coordinated guerilla attacks.496  
However, Rome’s fortunes changed under the leadership of the future emperor Vespasian.  He 
systematically reduced towns friendly to the rebellion, taking care to punish insurgents while 
sparing the pro-Roman and neutral population.497  Jewish deserters were enticed to join the 
Roman side, bringing intelligence in return for imperial pardon.498  These Roman victories 
unnerved those in Jerusalem, and renewed partisan strife saw the movement become increasingly 
radicalized.499  More conservative factions were inclined to make peace, having become 
disheartened by younger fanatics; in Josephus’ judgment, “The infection which spread thence 
among the younger sort, who were zealous for it, brought the public to destruction.”500  By the 
time Jerusalem was besieged in AD 70, much of the populated countryside had been regained.  
The rebel government persisted bravely but fruitlessly, being cordoned into smaller and smaller 
sections of the city by Roman siegecraft.501  Eventually, it was announced that the last stubborn 
insurgents would receive no quarter, and the subsequent Roman breakthrough saw them 
slaughtered to a man.502       
 After the fall of Jerusalem, the insurgency became a predominantly rural struggle based 
in southern Palestine.503  These guerillas were methodically separated from population centers 
before being hunted and killed at leisure.  The prowess of the Roman army and division of the 
rebels precluded any hope for Jewish success, and this reality was demonstrated often and 
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mercilessly.  In one especially memorable instance, a Roman general encountered insurgents 
operating from the Forest of Jardes.  According to Josephus:  
[The general] surrounded the whole place with his horsemen, that such of the Jews as had boldness enough 
to try to break through might have no way possible for escaping, by reason of the situation of these 
horsemen; and for the footmen, he ordered them to cut down the trees that were in the wood wither they 
fled.  So the Jews were under a necessity of performing some glorious exploit, and of greatly exposing 
themselves in battle.504 
Eventually, it came down to the 962 Sicarii at the mountain fortress of Masada.505  The resultant 
outlay of military force and effort – an overkill discussed at the beginning of this study – should 
make more sense in light of the long counterinsurgency operation that preceded it.  Rome had 
spent the last six years gradually neutralizing the revolt that had swept the region.  Accordingly, 
the spectacle of the siege of Masada must have been oriented toward deterring future rebellion 
from taking place.  Based on Judaea’s virtual pacification for the next sixty years, this operation 
proved successful.506 
 Ultimately, the Jewish War of AD 66-72 – like the other thirteen episodes examined in 
this section – suggests a series of patterns met with similar solutions.  Roman insurgencies were 
typically veiled in ideological causes and led by those familiar with the Roman way of life.  They 
were not simple wars of resistance, and often carried ambitious political goals.  Waged as much 
against local institutions as the broader Roman state, these movements depended on 
asymmetrical tactics before transitioning to more conventional force.  Meanwhile, the Roman 
response evolved toward a pattern of location, isolation, and eradication.  Especially in later 
revolts, diplomacy was used to drive wedges between members of the insurgent coalition.  
Population centrism was emphasized, even if its methods were often brutally straightforward.  
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This summary of insurgent and counterinsurgent characteristics, while limited by scarcity of 
sources, suggests a number of parallels with contemporary theory.  It is toward an enumeration 
and proof of these similarities that this study now turns.  
IV. ANALYSIS 
i. Insurgents against Rome 
 Having identified both the broad context and specific instances of likely Roman 
insurgency, it remains necessary to evaluate these episodes in light of contemporary insurgency 
characteristics.  This will be accomplished by considering evidence of ideological cause, 
coalition-building, politically targeted violence, shift from asymmetrical to symmetrical warfare, 
and counterstate emergence.  By establishing a relationship between these modern insurgency 
criteria and selected accounts of anti-Roman revolt, this study’s first proposition – that Rome 
faced explicit insurgency challenge – will be decisively established.  Additionally, Roman 
conceptualization of ancient insurgency will also be investigated, revealing how actual Roman 
practitioners understood the rebellions they were tasked with suppressing.  This examination 
ultimately shows that, while anti-Roman revolts typically display the traits and nuances of 
modern insurgency, the Romans themselves were far less appreciative of these complexities. 
a. Modern Criteria 
 The “formidable asset” of any successful insurgency – that of a strong ideological 
motivator – is well attested among selected cases.507  These rallying causes generally constitute 
either independence movements, pan-nativist expression, or religious outcry.  Independence was 
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a clear inducement in the defection of Capua during the Second Punic War, the slave movement 
of Spartacus, and the revolt of Tacfarinas.  Each instigator roiled under perceived Roman 
oppression, seeking grasping at any potential avenue of escape. Meanwhile, pan-nativism 
saturates the account of every insurgency which took place beyond the confines of Italy.  Even 
more than a century into the process of Romanization, a yearning for the illusory “good old 
days” could capture the spirit of otherwise integrated provincials, as in the revolt of Florus and 
Sacrovir or Batavian Revolt.  However, nativist appeals proved most potent in regions 
undergoing especially rapid cultural transformation, evidenced by the revolts of Vercingetorix 
and Arminius.  Religious motivation, often indistinguishable from more generalized nativist 
sentiment due to the ignorance of ancient writers, stands clearest in the cases of Vercingetorix, 
Arminius, Boudicca, and the Jewish War.  One case uniquely positioned by ideological criteria is 
that of the Social War, whose impetus (besides general anti-Roman sentiment) was a specific 
political cause.  Ultimately, however, all selected episodes share strong ideological 
underpinnings which were able to appeal to wide subsets of the population. 
 Just as insurgency demands a cause, it also requires the assembly of an increasingly 
broad coalition often united by a strong leader.  Coalition-building constitutes an agonizing 
process in several selected cases, and must also represent an unelaborated aspect in every other.  
This challenge is most evidenced by the complexity of the Jewish War’s opening months, in 
which several distinct factions (uncomfortably) combined to launch their coup against Roman 
rule.  Other examples like Psuedo-Philip’s harsh reprisals during the Fourth Macedonian War 
and infighting among participants of the Dalmatian and Pannonian Revolts speak to the 
difficulties of keeping insurgents focused and disciplined.  Related are the inspirational leaders 
often used to maintain unity among various dissident parties.  Spartacus, despite having to make 
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deep concessions to rival leaders, is credited with keeping his slave rebellion intact far longer 
than it might have remained under a less competent commander.508  Similarly, the mythical 
status of figures like Vercingetorix and Boudicca suggests that these leaders played a critical role 
in both spreading and sustaining their respective revolts.  With their death or capture, their 
movements quickly disintegrated. 
 Insurgencies harness early violence toward larger political ends.  While record is limited 
of ancient rebels’ initial use of violence (Roman historians are understandably biased toward 
large, setpiece battles), surviving accounts suggest a similar strategic purpose.  Several revolts 
begin with the slaughter of Roman citizens, instigating moderates in the crimes of extremist 
insurgents and coercively securing their support.  This is evidenced by the revolt of Florus and 
Sacrovir and revolt of Boudicca, two instances in which it is explicitly suggested that seemingly 
random atrocities had specific political aims.509  The most pronounced instances of targeted 
violence, however, are demonstrated by the early history of the Jewish War.  Assassination and 
agitation by the terroristic Sicarii helped undermine the position of Judaea’s pro-Roman elites, 
causing Jewish unrest to spiral in the years preceding actual hostilities.  Other acts, like the 
massacre of a surrendering Roman garrison or peace-offering emissary, were unambiguously 
intended to strengthen rebel authority and support.  Altogether, such violence appears to have 
been effective in bolstering insurgent influence on populations at large. 
 Successful insurgencies are those which gradually evolve from irregular to regular tactics 
and previously scattered guerillas are consolidated in conventional forces.  Since ancient sources 
are inclined to report only major incidents in Roman history, it is unsurprising that all selected 
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revolts evidence direct battlefield confrontation with Rome.  In fact, these accounts often 
marginalize or exclude insurgency’s irregular beginnings; the Social War or revolt of Boudicca, 
for instance, seem to produce standing armies out of mid air.  Clearest evidence of this 
transformation may be a passage of Caesar which attests to the process by which Vercingetorix’s 
“levy of down-and-outs” became a “large force” which in turn became a powerful military 
contributed by many Gallic tribes.510  In most selected cases, however, this shift to conventional 
arms leads to relatively rapid insurgent defeat.  Florus and Sacrovir and Boudicca succumbed 
almost immediately, while Vercingetorix survived only slightly longer.  The revolts of Spartacus, 
Arminius and Tacfarinas offer both immediate repudiation and ultimate proof of this rule.  
Although Spartacus conceded the inevitability of high-intensity defeat (and only gives battle at 
the demand of those under his leadership), his generalship permitted him several months of 
impressive battlefield victories.  Similarly, Arminius’ skillful performance at the Battle of 
Teutoburg Forest essentially achieved his ideological goals, although it did not ensure the 
survival of the movement itself.  Finally, Tacfarinas curtailed conventional loss into an extended 
and frequently successful guerilla struggle, being defeated years after the rout of his conventional 
forces. It should be noted, however, that even among these examples, no insurgency escaped 
eventual decimation by Roman arms. 
 A final characteristic of insurgency is the process by which a rebel counterstate emerges, 
supported by the movement’s newfound political legitimacy.  This development – only possible 
in the most advanced stages of insurgency – is nevertheless evidenced by several selected cases.  
The belligerent socii of the Social War, buttressed by early success, declared a de facto state and 
independent capital in an expression of Italian identity.  In another example, Vercingetorix 
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exploited initial victories to attain the title of king and establish a (short-lived) Gallic nation.  
Most significantly, the long insurgent occupation of Jerusalem over the course of the Jewish War 
led to the assumption of formal governmental duties, including the minting of currency.  Each of 
these actions testifies to the immense amount of political authority these insurgencies were able 
to muster over a brief period of time.  Coupled with demonstrations of ideological motivation, 
evidence of coalition-building, use of politically oriented violence, and pursuit of conventional 
force transformation, selected episodes conform well to the criteria of insurgency introduced at 
the beginning of this study. 
b. Ancient Context 
 If instances of revolt against Rome constituted insurgencies under the criteria of modern 
theorists, it remains to be determined how these disturbances were viewed in the eyes of ancient 
practitioners.  Notwithstanding obvious scarcity of evidence, there is little indication that 
Romans distinguished insurgency from more generalized acts of violence.  Insurgents were 
latrones, or “bandits,” a term applied liberally to any individual who promulgated unrest 
contrary to the rule of law.511  This led to politically motivated insurgents being dismissed in the 
same stroke as apolitical highwaymen or brigands, marginalizing both their movement and 
reason for revolt.  As further proof of the term’s degrading connotations, latro also became a 
term to cast aspersion on political enemies; its use would have been common in an exchange 
between two feuding senators.512  This array of applications meant that there were many 
unspecified categories of latro, and the word saw broad use. 
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 Accordingly, the terroristic Sicarii who made their last stand at Masada are called 
bandits, not terrorists or insurgents or ideologues.513  Although Josephus considers them “bandits 
in different form” while charting their politically motivated acts of domestic violence, he takes 
the distinction no further.514  Other notable insurgencies presented in this study receive similar 
treatment by ancient sources.  The emergence of Viriathus during the Lusitanian War and rise of 
Tacfarinas during his Numidian revolt receive similarly dismissive treatment.515  Of Viriathus’ 
career, for instance, Livy observes: “From shepherd a hunter, from hunter a bandit, and then 
soon the general of a real army.”516  Sources describe the banditry endemic to Judaea for much of 
Roman rule, suggesting – but not elucidating – the possibility of many other failed insurgencies 
among the Jewish population.517  In the particular case of Judaea, these bandits are also described 
as engaging in “political” murder, adding credence to this possibility.518  Most generally, records 
of latrones increase dramatically when provinces begin to shift toward formalized Roman 
administration, adding additional weight to the notion of bandits as insurgents.519 
 The complexities of ancient insurgency, obscured by labels of banditry, would have been 
little apparent to Roman counterinsurgency practitioners of the day.  The reason for this is 
simple: Roman pride.  High-minded rebels were lumped in the same category as debased robbers 
in order to demean their character and marginalize their cause.520  To do otherwise would have 
been incompatible with the requirements of the Roman values system.  Respect could only be 
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accorded to legitimate combatants beyond the Rome’s sphere of influence; to recognize the 
legitimacy of an insurgent would be to concede the failings of the Roman state.  According to the 
Digest, a compendium of longstanding Roman law compiled by the emperor Justinian in the 
sixth century AD, “Enemies are those who have declared war on us or on whom we have 
declared war; all the rest are bandits or plunderers.”521  This extreme form of denial restricted 
Rome’s overall understanding of the complex movements directed against her.  While 
contemporary observers may rightly characterize these episodes as insurgencies, Roman writers 
and practitioners were never so sophisticated in their own analysis.          
ii. Rome as Counterinsurgent 
 Having affirmed one major proposition of this study, it remains necessary to affirm the 
other.  A wide overview complemented by a set of distinct cases has succeeded in 
contextualizing Roman counterinsurgency practice.  It has yet to be determined, however, to 
what extent this behavior adheres to the expectations of modern theory.  This will be 
accomplished by identifying signs of institutional limitation, gradual development of anti-
guerilla techniques, intentional targeting of insurgents’ coalition, reestablishment of 
governmental legitimacy, and an overriding population-centric focus.  By drawing links between 
the actions of ancient practitioners and expectations of contemporary theorists, this study’s 
second hypothesis – that Rome evidenced a clear counterinsurgency strategy – will be proven.  
Moreover, this section will explore the degree to which this behavior was consciously 
implemented.  Such inquiry ultimately reveals that, contrary to the obliviousness Rome showed 
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toward causes and traits of insurgency, her agents were remarkably savvy in how they perceived 
the elimination of insurgent threats.    
 
 
a. Modern Criteria 
 Status quo powers are subject to a degree of rigidity in their behavior and 
counterinsurgent response.  Restricted by the mantle of governmental legitimacy, certain courses 
of action are either unrealistic or off limits entirely.  In its way, Rome was similarly inhibited 
from taking steps which – while potentially effective – ran counter to necessary state functions.  
Two selected episodes attest to successful counterinsurgency strategies that were abandoned due 
to political pressure.  Fabius’ tactics during the Second Punic War harried Hannibal’s forces and 
deterred alliance defection, achieving their aims but proving unacceptably slow to politicians in 
Rome.  Similarly, Crassus’ plodding war of attrition against Spartacus in the Third Servile War 
may have reduced insurgent strength, but it did little to quell the anxieties in Rome and was 
consequently abandoned.  Such strategies, effective at fighting insurgents, were ineffective at 
ensuring the safety of the larger population and hence proved unsustainable.  Also significant is 
the general tenacity Rome showed in countering, neutralizing, and eradicating all challenges to 
imperial authority.  This was not the behavior of an exploitative hegemon; suppression of these 
revolts often required huge resource expenditures with limited economic and strategic gains.  
Instead, Rome’s actions suggest her role as a territorial empire, ensuring the sanctity of her 
provinces even at great national cost. 
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 A necessary component of any counterinsurgency effort is the formulation of a militarily 
effective counter-guerilla strategy.  High-intensity supremacy does not guarantee low-intensity 
proficiency.  In the case of Rome, however, the imperial army proved competent in adapting to 
the requirements of asymmetrical warfare.  As this study demonstrates, this shift was 
accomplished by a growth in paramilitary and policing capabilities, gradually altering the 
composition of the army with the addition of light supplementary units like the auxilia and 
numeri.  Although this development eventually undermined Rome’s high-intensity capability, it 
undeniably bolstered the empire’s counter-guerilla capabilities.  More specific doctrinal 
evolution is attested by the operation undertaken by Blaesus against Tacfarinas’ irregular forces.  
Blaesus’ division of Numidia into military zones and use of mobile light infantry demonstrated a 
successful tactical transformation which neutralized Tacfarinas’ strengths.  Assuming Blaesus’ 
innovations did not abruptly vanish with his death, this knowledge almost certainly informed 
future counterinsurgency practice.  The Roman army, while slow to adapt, was still capable of 
meeting the challenges of asymmetrical warfare. 
 Another counterinsurgency prescription involves the targeting and fragmentation of an 
insurgency’s base of support.  By a series of enticements and diplomatic initiatives, insurgency 
can be reduced while avoiding the costs of direct force.  Remarkably, Rome – a power typically 
associated with mass crucifixion and indiscriminate slaughter – resorted often to these methods.  
In a first and highly effective use of wedge-driving, Rome’s strategic provision of citizenship 
during the Social War effectively splintered the socii resistance, causing mass defection while 
isolating the remaining hardliners.  From there, relevant cases multiply.  The Dalmatian and 
Pannonian revolts were blunted by Rome’s courting of individual tribal leaders, while Blaesus’ 
stratagem against Tacfarinas began with a highly effective offer of amnesty.  The Batavian revolt 
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was resolved almost entirely through the use of persuasion (evidenced especially by Roman 
attempts to bribe Civilis’ prophetess), while Arminius saw battlefield defeat after much of his 
tribal support had been peeled away.  The rebels of the Jewish War took great aims to combat 
this Roman strategy, yet their movement still succumbed to factionalism as Vespasian’s 
successes mounted.  An unusual and prolonged instance of diplomatic warfare can be found in 
Rome’s complicated relationship with the semi-autonomous hill tribes of Mauretania, Ituraea, 
and Isauria.  By appealing to tribal moderates through the use of concessions and subsidies, 
Rome was able to avoid what otherwise would have been a painful series of insurgencies.  
Altogether, these nonviolent actions played a persistent and successful role in Rome’s 
counterinsurgent conduct. 
  Counterinsurgency’s central aim entails the reestablishment of governmental legitimacy, 
by either coercion or consent.  This effort is necessarily population-centric; simple levying of 
military force is insufficient to the task of asserting political authority.  Unsurprisingly, chosen 
episodes attest often to Rome’s persuasive use of fear and intimidation for this purpose.  Brutal 
reprisals were part of Rome’s standard operating procedure; their very frequency and 
inevitability must have prevented many insurgencies from gathering momentum in the first 
place.  Instances like the punitive anti-German campaigns following the Battle of Teutoburg 
Forest, the wholesale massacre of insurgent-controlled districts in Jerusalem, and drastic Roman 
action against Jewish rebels at the Forest of Jardes and Masada were clearly intended for much 
wider audiences.  Other calculated displays of force, reflected by the distribution of Capuan 
slaves in the Second Punic War and Scipio Aemlianus’ dismemberment of insurgent 
sympathizers during his siege of Numantine, were similarly directed toward broad reaffirmation 
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of Roman authority.  This violence did its job well; there is good reason why most regions show 
many years of quiet between disruptions. 
 Yet Rome’s population-centrism did not rely solely on deterrence by retribution.  
Clemency, forgiveness, and protection also played a role in these population-centric practices.  
Examples range across the chronology of selected cases.  The consul Caepio’s forgiveness and 
settlement of many Lusitanians at the conclusion of the Lusitanian War revealed an appreciation 
for the steps necessary to restore governmental legitimacy and ensure lasting stability.  On the 
other end of the spectrum, Vespasian’s insistence on separating insurgents from the neutral and 
pro-Roman elements of reoccupied towns (instead of simply executing residents en masse) 
demonstrated a conscious effort to gain authority by content, not simple coercion.  These 
instances of peaceful persuasion – supplemented by identified examples of institutional 
limitation, anti-guerilla development, diplomatic wedge-driving, and reaffirmation of 
governmental legitimacy – fulfill the expectations and criteria of counterinsurgent behavior.  
Accordingly, ancient Roman practice can be said to adhere to the general principles of modern 
counterinsurgency theory. 
b. Ancient Context 
This study has established Rome’s place as an ancient imperial power whose behavior 
reflects the precepts of contemporary counterinsurgency theory.  However, this is not the limit of 
conclusions that can be drawn from available evidence.  It can also be asserted that Roman 
practitioners understood and consciously followed many aspects of this proto-counterinsurgency 
doctrine.  Population-centrism (typically for the purpose of fear and capitulation) constituted a 
critical element in a variety of Roman practices.  Polybius, reflecting on Rome’s gratuitously 
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violent sacking of certain cities, wrote, “It seems to me that they do this for the sake of terror.522  
Looting and massacre, while certainly motivated by the whims of individual soldiers, also served 
a broader political purpose by which governmental legitimacy was brutally reaffirmed.  Other 
aspects of counterinsurgency, like the difficulty of suppressing decentralized revolt and the 
imperative of targeting population centers before isolated insurgent strongholds, were well 
appreciated by ancient practitioners.523  Two types of war were understood: those that were 
“real” (between two states) and all others which were not.524  While Romans were loathe to 
participate in the second type of conflict, they never harbored delusions that doing so was not 
necessary. 
Two excerpted legal passages, both dating from the sixth century AD, attest to Rome’s 
counterinsurgency awareness.  While these documents were compiled after the fall of the 
Western Roman Empire, they reflected long-standing Roman realities and conceptions.525  The 
first, drawn from the Digest of Justinian, concerns the role of a provincial governor:  
It is the duty of a good and serious governor to see that the province he governs remains peaceful and quiet. 
 This is not a difficult task if he scrupulously rids the province of evil men, and assiduously hunts them 
down.  Indeed, he must hunt down…bandits, kidnappers, and common thieves, and punish each one in 
accordance with his misdeeds.  And he must use force against their collaborators, without whom the bandit 
is not able to remain hidden for long.526 
Evaluated in the dual contexts of ancient Roman practice and contemporary counterinsurgency 
theory (and understanding the interchangeability of “bandit” and “insurgent”), this passage 
suggests an appreciation that insurgency is intrinsically linked to support of the population.  It is 
complemented by another excerpt, this one from the Codex of Justinian: 
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When the agents themselves, the owner, or the superintendents of the land, acknowledge that they are 
unable to control the multitude of [bandits] aforesaid…the Governor shall cause military aid to be 
furnished by the tribune or the other officers…but when, after the production of the alleged culprits, it 
becomes evident that they are innocent, and have committed no crime, their accuser will be compelled to 
suffer the punishment inflicted upon calumniators, for it establishes a bad precedent to seek for [bandits], 
and by doing so place innocent persons in jeopardy.527 
Coupled with another law directly preceding it, this warning applies to the reprisal of individuals 
falsely believed to be insurgents and insurgent sympathizers.528  Such a reading relays a 
remarkably sophisticated counterinsurgency understanding: while effort should be made to 
reduce insurgency support among the population, overly harsh or misdirected measures may 
instead lead to increased sympathy due to the “bad precedent” set by the counterinsurgent.  This 
language is hardly as clear as Galula or FM 3-24, but it represents the codification of ideas long 
known to the Romans and not unlike the prescriptions of contemporary theorists. 
 Ultimately, while Rome evidenced only marginal understanding of her insurgency 
challenge, she demonstrated a firm grasp of the means and methods by which to eliminate it.  
This is reflected by Rome’s longstanding use of terror and reprisal for the purpose of asserting 
(and maintaining) imperial authority.  This is also reflected by the appreciation Roman 
practitioners showed for the relationship between insurgency and wider society.  They may not 
have understood how or why insurgencies started, but they had a good idea of how to keep them 
restrained.  The key was the population: by depriving insurgents of their base of support, Rome 
could isolate and eradicate the rebels at her leisure.529  This behavior, exhibited throughout the 
course of Roman history and amicable to the criteria of modern theorists, can only be described 
as deliberate counterinsurgency practice.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
i. Findings 
 This study has constituted the proof of two broad propositions: that nearly all of Rome’s 
military challenges can be understood as insurgencies and that Rome’s reaction evidences many 
of the tenets still foundational to contemporary counterinsurgency theory.  These hypotheses 
have been evaluated through a comprehensive investigation of context, practice, and theoretical 
grounding.   
 Inquiry began by identifying the broad framework within which both insurgency and 
counterinsurgency operated.  An acclamation with Roman grand strategy bestows familiarity 
with the economic, security, and values considerations which persistently haunted Roman 
policymakers.  After Rome’s shift to a tax-based economy, the protection of her provinces 
adopted a new financial imperative.  Similarly, the empire’s deterrence-based security model 
demanded immediate response to any perceived military challenge.  Most significantly, the 
highly visible and influential role of values in Roman society effectively forbade any 
contravention of Roman Victoria and global predominance.  These realities helped foster an 
environment in which provincial revolt could never be downplayed or ignored.  Meanwhile, the 
Roman army’s appreciable conventional superiority did not prepare it for the very different 
challenges of policing and irregular encounters.  Adapting to these roles took time, and in the 
process, the army would eventually cede much of its high-intensity capability.  Permeating all of 
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this was the unique phenomenon of Romanization.  Through a combination of socioeconomic, 
political, and cultural mechanisms, foreign peoples grew to embrace the Roman way of life.  
While this was an organic and process, it engendered tension among unintegrated populations, 
forming a catalyst for future anti-Roman movements. 
 A broad swath of episodes attests to insurgent threat and counterinsurgent response from 
the years 216 BC to AD 72.  These instances were selected based on their date, available 
documentation, imperial inclusion, and evidence of population centrality.  Discrete categories 
were introduced to track the nature of Rome’s insurgency challenge and suggest the 
sophistication of her counterinsurgency response: insurgency in infancy, insurgency at home, 
insurgency abroad, insurgency triumphant, and insurgency realized.  The first cases constitute a 
tenuous insurgency presence and debatable counterinsurgent action; sources are vague and many 
particulars go unrealized.  In the next category, threats in Italy increase insurgency’s salience and 
produce a corresponding boost in Rome’s counterinsurgency interest.  The subsequent series of 
provincial crises draws out common patterns and further attests to the existence of overarching 
behavioral and theoretical elements.  However, this is not universal; two other examples during 
this period defy easy categorization, illustrating Roman concession in order to avoid unprofitable 
expenditure of effort.  Finally, the detailed elaboration of insurgency in the Jewish War 
demonstrates both the extent of Rome’s insurgency threat and the growing sophistication of her 
counterinsurgency solutions.  In sum, these fourteen selected cases evidence similar 
characteristics across very different circumstances. 
 Analysis becomes possible after establishing both an underlying context and collection of 
specific instances for the purpose of examination.  This body of precedent was assessed via the 
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application of this study’s first proposition, conceptualization of Roman military challenges as 
modernly defined insurgencies.  Correlation is found via evidence of an ideological cause, 
coalition-building, politically targeted violence, intentional shifts from asymmetrical to 
symmetrical warfare, and the (occasional) emergence of a fully developed rebel counterstate.  
However, these criteria remain beyond the cognizance of ancient Roman practitioners.  Due to a 
blinding national pride which forbade the legitimization of any challenge to the state, Roman 
conceptions of insurgency never escaped stereotyping as another form of banditry.  Rome’s 
insurgencies may have been complicated phenomena, but this complexity was never appreciated 
by ancient observers. 
 Having determined the veracity of this study’s first proposition, its second hypothesis – 
revision of Roman response as explicit counterinsurgency practice – was applied to the broad 
collection of imperial circumstances and wide-ranging insurgency episodes.  A match was 
established, demonstrated by signs of institutional limitation, developing anti-guerilla techniques, 
intentional targeting of insurgents’ coalition, reestablishment of governmental legitimacy, and 
overarching population-centrism.  Moreover, it was determined that such characteristics were 
well appreciated by Rome over the course of her empire.  Available textual evidence testifies to 
remarkable sophistication on the part of Roman practitioners.  Such doctrinal refinement is a 
surprising discovery, and justifies the attention this study accords Rome as a practicing and often 
successful counterinsurgent power. 
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ii. Modern practice, ancient precedent 
 Ultimately, this study’s significance goes beyond its assertion that Rome faced 
appreciable insurgency and evinced appropriate counterinsurgent response.  Although this point 
is original, it is also unflatteringly abstract.  Simply establishing the fact of Roman 
counterinsurgency practice does little to advance contemporary theory or otherwise aid academic 
inquiry.  Instead, the real importance of this paper lies in the larger story it tells.  Over the course 
of a hundred pages, a highly unlikely counterinsurgent has been remolded, recast, and reassessed 
in the vein of Galula and FM 3-24.  By the study’s conclusion, Rome – an ancient empire of 
sword-wielders and chariot-riders without even a basic knowledge of geography – has joined the 
ranks of counterinsurgent powers thousands of years more advanced.530  Despite a technological 
and ideological divide of millennia, Rome shows itself proficient with a doctrine most states still 
struggle with today.  This fact speaks to the universality of the insurgency challenge, and 
suggests a remarkable historical continuity in how this threat is overcome.      
 To be sure, strong distinctions exist between Rome and modern counterinsurgent powers.  
Entire chapters from Galula and FM 3-24 are inapplicable to the Roman context.  Galula’s steps 
for establishing local elections and organizing a political party, for instance, would not be 
communicable to the Roman experience.531  As another salient example, the multifaceted 
information environment characteristic of contemporary insurgency challenges simply did not 
exist in the ancient world.  When FM 3-24 warns of the power of media and strategic corporals, 
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it is speaking to purely modern phenomena.532  The clearest difference between Roman and 
modern times, however, is reflected by one of FM 3-24’s most critical passages: 
Army and Marine Corps leaders work proactively to establish and maintain the proper ethical climate of 
their organizations.  They serve as visible examples for every subordinate, demonstrating cherished values 
and military virtues in their decisions and actions…Under all conditions, they must remain faithful to basic 
American, Army, and Marine Corps standards of proper behavior and respect for the sanctity of life.533    
No such ethical climate existed in the Roman world.  The values paramount to Roman thought 
were the primacy of victory and predominance of the empire.  Sanctity of life would have 
presented a likewise alien notion.  For this reason, modern practice and ancient precedent will 
never be directly analogous, and the population-centrism of Roman practice – communicated by 
the use of fear and mass reprisal – is neither directly applicable nor desirable to modern times. 
  Yet despite the gulf between Rome and contemporary powers, they remain part of the 
same broad heritage.  The insurgencies confronted today in Iraq and Afghanistan share much in 
common with the insurgencies confronted 2,000 years ago in Gaul, Germany, and Judaea.  
Similarly, the aims of governmental legitimacy and population-centrism evidenced in modern 
counterinsurgency initiatives remain fundamentally unaltered from their much earlier Roman 
iterations.  For this reason, just as Roman practice is illuminated by the precepts of Galula and 
FM 3-24, so too should contemporary theory be reassessed in light of these ancient antecedents.  
The period typically ascribed to the start of the modern counterinsurgency era, placed at the end 
of World War I, may in fact fall twenty centuries too late.  
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